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WHY SO CONTRIVED?
FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING,
PER SE RULES, AND
DNA DATABASES AFTER
MARYLAND V. KING
DAVID H. KAYE*
In Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), the Supreme Court
narrowly upheld the constitutionality of routine collection and storage of
DNA samples and profiles from arrestees. In doing so, it stepped outside
the usual framework that treats warrantless searches as per se
unconstitutional unless they fall within specified exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements. Instead, the Court balanced various
individual and state interests. Yet, as regards the state interests, the Court
confined this direct balancing analysis to the perceived value of using DNA
to inform certain pretrial decisions. Oddly, it avoided relying directly on
DNA’s more obvious value in generating investigative leads in unsolved
crimes.
This Article suggests that this contrived analysis resulted from the
structure of existing Fourth Amendment case law (and perhaps a desire to
avoid intimating that a more egalitarian and extensive DNA database
system also would be constitutional). It demonstrates that the opinion does
not support a “no lines” system of ad hoc judgments about the
reasonableness of every search using the totality of the circumstances.
Recognizing that the existing framework of categorical exceptions to the
warrant requirement diverges from an older “warrant preference” rule that
demands a warrant whenever feasible, the Article shows that King leaves
the current per se framework largely intact.
* Distinguished Professor of Law and Weiss Family Scholar, and Graduate Faculty
Member, Program in Forensic Science, The Pennsylvania State University. A draft of this
Article was presented at the Stanford Law and Biosciences Workshop. I am grateful to Hank
Greely, Jake Sherkow, and other workshop participants for their comments, to Jesse Choper
for discussion of Maryland v. King, and to Sihan Wang for research assistance.
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Nevertheless, this Article questions the resort to direct balancing. It
presents a more coherent doctrinal framework for scrutinizing not just DNA
profiling, but all forms of biometric data collection and analysis. In this
regard, it notes that the dissenting King opinion overstates the differences
between fingerprinting and DNA profiling as currently practiced. Finally,
it suggests that the cramped reasoning in both opinions limits the
implications of the case for more aggressive DNA database laws—ones that
cover more crimes, more people, more loci, and more methods for
acquiring DNA samples.
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INTRODUCTION
1

In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the practice of routinely collecting DNA from arrested
individuals.2 A bare majority of five Justices effusively endorsed the

1

133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
Id. at 1980. A similar but shorter description of the case than the one provided here can
be found in David H. Kaye, What the Supreme Court Hasn’t Told You About DNA
Databases, PROMEGA CORP. (2013), available at http://goo.gl/CkjEVy.
2
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acquisition of DNA samples for “identification” before conviction (DNABC).3 In response, four dissenting Justices called the opinion a precedentshattering and “scary”4 foundation for “the construction of . . . a genetic
panopticon”5 that could gaze into the DNA of airline travelers, motorists,
and public school students.6
The case began when police in Maryland arrested Alonzo King for
menacing people with a shotgun.7 Following the arrest, they took his
picture, recorded his fingerprints—and swabbed the inside of his cheeks.8
When checked against Maryland’s DNA database, his DNA profile led to
the discovery that six years earlier, King had held a gun to the head of a
fifty-three-year-old woman and raped her.9 Before the DNA match, the
police had no reason to suspect King of that crime. Lacking probable
cause—or even reasonable suspicion—they did not rely on a judicial order
to swab his cheek. They relied on a state law that mandated collection of
DNA from all people charged with a crime of violence or burglary.10
King appealed the resulting rape conviction.11 He argued that the
DNA collection deprived him of the right, guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, to be free from unreasonable searches or
seizures.12 Maryland’s highest court agreed.13 It held that except in the
rarest of circumstances where a suspect’s true identity could not be
established by conventional methods—the court gave the example of a face
transplant14—forcing an arrestee to submit to DNA sampling was
unconstitutional.15
The state petitioned the Supreme Court for review.16 Over and over,
the Court had denied requests from convicted offenders and, more recently,
3
See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (“The advent of DNA technology is one of the most
significant scientific advancements of our era.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 52,
61, and 72.
4
Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1966 (majority opinion).
8
Id.
9
See King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553–54 (Md. 2012).
10
Id. at 552, 553; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis
2011).
11
King, 42 A.3d at 555.
12
See id.
13
See id. at 555–56.
14
Id. at 580 n.35.
15
See id. at 580.
16
See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (granting a
stay of judgment pending a likely grant of certiorari).
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from arrestees to address the legality of state and federal laws mandating
routine collection of their DNA. But this case was different. Never before
had a state supreme court or a federal appellate court deemed a DNA
database law unconstitutional.17 Even before the Court met to consider
whether it would review the case, Chief Justice John Roberts stayed the
Maryland judgment.18 His chambers opinion stated “there is a fair prospect
that this Court will reverse the decision below”19 and found that “the
decision below subjects Maryland to ongoing irreparable harm.”20
The Chief Justice’s prediction proved correct. But the margin of
victory was as narrow as it could be, and the majority opinion leaves
important questions unresolved. Moreover, the dissenting Justices issued a
biting opinion importuning the Court “some day”21 to repudiate its
“incursion upon the Fourth Amendment.”22 Indeed, when Justice Anthony
Kennedy announced the opinion of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia
invoked the rare practice of reading a dissent aloud. For eleven minutes, he
mocked the majority’s defense of Maryland’s law as a means of identifying
arrestees.23 “[I]f the Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no
such thing as error,” he railed.24 As he and the three Justices who joined his
dissenting opinion (Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan) saw it, the majority’s reasoning “taxes the credulity of the
credulous.”25
17

See David H. Kaye, On the “Considered Analysis” of Collecting DNA Before
Conviction, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 104, 106 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, “Considered
Analysis”]. The only appellate defeat before 2012 came in In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006). See David H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Collection Before
Conviction: An Updated Scorecard, FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Mar. 30, 2013),
http://goo.gl/D4b4Dl (listing earlier cases in which courts found DNA database laws
constitutional).
18
See King, 133 S. Ct. at 3.
19
Id.
20
Id. The Chief Justice maintained that “[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from
effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable
injury.” Id. (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). But the notion that every court order that blocks
enforcement of a duly enacted law works an irreparable injury seems extravagant. See
David H. Kaye, Supreme Court to Review DNA Swabbing on Arrest??, FORENSIC SCI.
STATISTICS & LAW (July 31, 2012), http://goo.gl/ugxcaG.
21
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1990 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22
Id. at 1989–90.
23
See Joan Biskupic, Analysis: With Trademark Vigor, Justice Scalia Dissents in DNA
Case, REUTERS (June 3, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://goo.gl/T5UhRd; Joan Biskupic, Colorful
Dissent Is in Scalia’s DNA, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 4, 2013, 8:24 AM),
http://goo.gl/gkalGW.
24
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1986.
25
Id. at 1980.
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The popular press and bloggers seized on the dissent’s portrayal of the
Court’s opinion.26 One trenchant journalist asked, “Why did Kennedy write
his opinion in a way that makes him sound like the last guy on Earth to
discover Law & Order?”27 Why indeed? Justice Kennedy knew perfectly
well that DNA-BC was being used to solve crimes. That was why the Chief
Justice had granted the stay. It was why Justice Samuel Alito had flagged
the case during the oral argument as “perhaps the most important criminal
procedure case that [the Supreme] Court has heard in decades.”28 It was
why the first words from Maryland’s Deputy Attorney General at oral
argument were “Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Since 2009,
when Maryland began to collect DNA samples from arrestees charged with
violent crimes and burglary, there had been 225 matches, 75 prosecutions
and 42 convictions, including that of Respondent King.”29
This Article explains why Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems so
contrived, describes more convincing (and doctrinally adequate) ways to
analyze the constitutionality of DNA-BC, and probes the boundaries of the
Court’s decision. I suggest that the King Court treated the primary value of
DNA-BC—as a crime-solving tool—as merely incidental to other functions
because of the Court’s ambivalent jurisprudence on the propriety of
balancing state and individual interests to ascertain the reasonableness of
searches under the Fourth Amendment. The majority was unwilling or
unable to speak clearly about the category of cases in which balancing is
permissible. It was unwilling or unable to consider creating an express
exception to accommodate the traditional rule that searches that do not fall
within defined exceptions necessarily require probable cause and a
warrant.30 As a result, the Court opened itself to the dissent’s charge of

26
Professor Jeffrey Rosen called the opinion Justice Scalia’s wittiest and finest
moment—“one of the best Fourth Amendment[] dissents, ever.” Jeffrey Rosen, A Damning
Dissent: Scalia’s Smartest, Wittiest Ruling of All Time, NEW REPUBLIC (June 4, 2013),
http://goo.gl/RgQzj2. Professor Noah Feldman agreed with the opinion’s “libertarian
impulse.” Noah Feldman, Court’s DNA Ruling Brings U.S. a Step Closer to ‘Gattaca,’
BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://goo.gl/fvIM8B, but described it as a “pungent”
declaration of “Luddite liberty,” id., “dripping with contempt,” Noah Feldman, Grumpy Old
Scalia v. Those Pesky Kids, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://goo.gl/qZcjfw.
27
Emily Bazelon, They’re Coming for Your DNA, SLATE, http://goo.gl/QpebpT (last
visited May 28, 2014).
28
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12207) [hereinafter Transcript].
29
Id. at 3. This was as far as she got before encountering Justice Scalia’s sarcasm:
“Well, that’s really good. I’ll bet you if you conducted a lot of unreasonable searches and
seizures, you’d get more convictions, too. (Laughter.) That proves absolutely nothing.” Id.
30
This possibility was noted in the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari but studiously
ignored for the remainder of the litigation. See infra Part II.C.
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blinking reality and of being less than “minimally competent [in]
English.”31
But the dissenting opinion, I maintain, fares no better. For all its barbs
and jibes, its turns of phrases, and its literary allusions, the opinion points to
no fundamental individual interest or social value that could justify so
bilious a condemnation of DNA-BC. It presents an oversimplified
description of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and applies a one-size-fitsall approach to all types of searches of the person, even though these
searches vary greatly in their impact on legitimate individual interests and
in their value to law enforcement.
In short, the opinions represent a lost opportunity to clarify the law on
balancing tests for Fourth Amendment rights and to scrutinize biometric
data collection and analysis practices within a more coherent doctrinal
framework. To explain and justify this assessment, Part I describes the
reasoning of the Justices. It shows how the majority opinion expands an illdefined set of cases in which a direct balancing of interests determines the
reasonableness of certain searches or seizures. It also maintains that the
dissent simply drew an arbitrary line that was compelled neither by
precedent nor by the interests that should determine the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection.
Part II looks more deeply into how the Court reasoned about
reasonableness. It describes the existing version of the rule that searches
without a warrant and probable cause are unreasonable without an
applicable exception—what I call the PSUWE (per-se-unreasonable-withexceptions) framework. It contrasts this framework to an earlier “warrant
preference” rule,32 regime,33 model,34 or view35 that “the modern Court has
31

King, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra note 53.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin & Julia Mirabella, Book Review, Framing the Fourth, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1061 (2011) (“[T]he ‘warrant preference’ rule . . . holds that a warrant
is a necessary precondition of a reasonable search, unless there is a compelling reason for
proceeding without one.”); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment
History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 584 (2008) (“According to a number of scholars, the
Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment to impose a ‘warrant preference rule’ favoring, and
sometimes mandating, searches pursuant to a specific warrant.”).
33
Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 856
n.196 (1994) (“In Professor Amar’s scheme of endlessly sliding scales of ‘reasonableness,’ the
rigidity of probable cause has no place. But in a warrant preference regime, a probable cause
requirement is necessary to prevent the exceptions to the Warrant Clause from swallowing the
rule by giving police broader power to search without warrants than with them.”).
34
Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487, 514 (2013)
(“There are at least five principal models that the Court currently chooses from to measure
reasonableness: the warrant preference model; the individualized suspicion model; the
totality of the circumstances test; the balancing test; and a hybrid model giving dispositive
weight to the common law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
32
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increasingly abandoned.”36 After explicating the difference between those
two methods for analyzing warrantless searches, it argues that King does
not obliterate the PSUWE framework. In addition, it suggests that
balancing within this framework to create either an exception under the
special needs rubric or a categorical exception for certain types of biometric
data would have been preferable to the majority’s direct resort to balancing.
Part III shows that the opinions in King, having been forged in the
crucible of incremental, case-by-case adjudication, do not come to grips
with obvious variations on Maryland’s version of DNA-BC, let alone the
most basic questions about DNA databases for law enforcement that society
must confront. In this Part, I try to elucidate these questions and to
enucleate the opinions’ implications for some variations in DNA-BC
statutes in light of likely advances in DNA science and technology. This
analysis requires us to attend to the nature of the DNA sequences that are,
and might be, used in law enforcement databases, the analogy between
anatomical biometrics and these DNA sequences, and the adequacy of
statutory protections against the misuse of genetic information. I conclude
with a brief discussion of the way in which legislatures should think about
building DNA databases for law enforcement now that the Court has issued
a construction permit.
I. THE COURT’S REASONING: FREE-FORM BALANCING WITH BLINDERS
Given the facts before the Court, King determined three things:
(1) buccal swabbing is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment; (2) the
constitutionality of this kind of search, performed on all individuals arrested
for serious crimes, turns on the balance of state and individual interests; and
(3) this balance favors the state when the swabbing is done (a) after charges
have been filed, (b) the loci tested do not reveal sensitive personal
information, and (c) statutory and administrative privacy safeguards are in
place.37 The first point was not in contention, as previous opinions had held
that blood and urine sampling—indeed, even scraping a little debris from
beneath a fingernail of a suspect38—are searches.39 The real controversies
35

Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1134–35 (2012) (“For much of the twentieth
century, the Court embraced what is called the warrant preference view of the Fourth
Amendment under which the validity of a search turned on whether the police sought prior
judicial authorization in the form of a warrant based on probable cause issued by a
magistrate judge.”).
36
Id. at 1135.
37
See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); infra Parts I.A–C.
38
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292, 295 (1973).
39
See, e.g., id.; D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 480 (2001).
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in the case were over the second and, to a lesser extent, the third point—
whether to balance and what outcome results from balancing.
A. DECIDING TO BALANCE

Justice Kennedy’s opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, and Alito) concluded that “the
search . . . falls within the category of cases this Court has analyzed by
reference to the proposition that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.’”40 At first glance, this
phrasing is puzzling. The touchstone in every case is reasonableness,41 but
a longstanding rule renders searches without probable cause or a warrant
automatically unreasonable unless they fall within “a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”42 A related rule renders
seizing a person without probable cause unreasonable—subject, again, to
various categorical exceptions.43
Typically, the PSUWE (per-seunreasonable-with-exceptions) rule suffices to invalidate warrantless
searches or detentions without probable cause without any further analysis
of the totality of the circumstances. King argued that this per se framework
applied in his case and that DNA-BC fits no existing exception.44

40

King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)).
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (“It is of course true that
in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”).
42
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In some twenty cases since Katz, the
Court has reiterated the per se rule. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013)
(“Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls
within a recognized exception.”). It has been called “[t]he Supreme Court’s favorite, and
oft-repeated, Fourth Amendment maxim.”
Craig M. Bradley, Rehnquist’s Fourth
Amendment: Be Reasonable, 82 MISS. L.J. 259, 272 (2013). The characterization of the
exceptions as “few” and “well-delineated,” however, is increasingly difficult to swallow.
See infra Part II.
43
See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013). Bailey delimited the
exception that permits “officers executing a search warrant to detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is conducted,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), even though the detention is “without probable cause to arrest for a crime,” id., and
without “particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a
specific danger to the officers,” id. at 1037–38.
44
Brief for Respondent at 14, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207) (“This Court has only
rarely created exceptions to the requirements of a warrant or individualized suspicion, and
none of the existing exceptions is applicable here.”).
41
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Despite academic criticism of the historical pedigree and value of
insisting on warrants whenever possible,45 the Court accepted the premise
that most searches require prior judicial approval or an established
exception to the warrant requirement.46 Rather than identify an existing
applicable exception or explicitly devise a new one, however, the Court
tried to confine the need for a categorical exception to a subset of all
searches, leaving the search before it to be judged under a balancing
standard. Thus, Justice Kennedy described the categorical-exception
approach as a preference defeasible “[i]n some circumstances such as
[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations
of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like.”47
This elliptical description of the circumstances in which the per se rule
gives way to direct balancing is reminiscent of the theory of “family
resemblances” propounded by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.48
Wittgenstein famously argued that some terms, such as “games,” do not
denote a set of elements with any single property in common, but that the
items in question are linked together like “members of a family—build,
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap
and criss-cross.”49 Like Wittgenstein, who knew a game when he saw one
but who deemed it unnecessary to articulate a common denominator, Justice
Kennedy pointed to a family of cases for which direct balancing is
appropriate without articulating any essential features of its members. 50
45
The now-classic challenge to the warrant preference rule comes from Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762 (1994). Professor
Amar, joined by Professor Katyal, later applied the notion that there is no historical case for
the rule to Maryland v. King. Akhil Reed Amar & Neal K. Katyal, Why the Court Was Right
to Allow Cheek Swabs, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), http://goo.gl/Y75vcL. For descriptions of
the foundations of the rule and some of the academic commentary on it, see infra Part II.A.
46 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (stating that “[i]n giving content
to the inquiry whether an intrusion is reasonable, the Court has preferred some quantum of
individualized suspicion . . . [as] a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,” but that
“[i]n some circumstances, such as [w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs,
diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that
certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure
reasonable,” because “[t]hose circumstances diminish the need for a warrant” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
47
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
48
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 36e (P. M. S. Hacker &
Joachim Schulte eds., G. E. M. Anscombe et al. trans., Blackwell Publ’g 4th ed. 2009)
(1953). This paragraph is adapted from David H. Kaye, Response, Maryland v. King: Per
Se Unreasonableness, the Golden Rule, and the Future of DNA Databases, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 39, 42 (2013).
49
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 48, at 36e.
50
The opinion suggests that the pointlessness of individualized factual determinations in
some settings (as in deciding when to take a fingerprint or a DNA sample from an arrestee
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Thus, although the majority was certain that the King case was part of this
still-small family, the opinion provides little guidance on recognizing other
cases that can be said to fall outside the PSUWE analysis.
B. BALANCING TO DECIDE

Having settled on the open-ended balancing standard for ascertaining
the reasonableness of the Maryland law, the majority applied it uncritically.
After praising “DNA technology [as] one of the most significant scientific
advancements of our era,”51 the Court noted “the need for law enforcement
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and
possessions they must take into custody.”52 To appreciate (and clarify) the
Court’s understanding of processing and identifying arrestees, two concepts
need to be disentangled. The dissent’s concern for the English language
notwithstanding,53 there is nothing linguistically sinful in using a single
overarching term. But the majority could have been clearer about how each
facet of “identification” figures into the balance of interests.
Justice Kennedy used the word “identification” to denote at least two
uses of biometric data.
The first we can call “authenticationidentification,”54 for it refers to authenticating claims of identity (or
establishing true identity). Authentication is the most common application
of biometric identifiers. A fingerprint-activated door lock can provide a
valid and reliable method for ensuring that only those employees who are
authorized to enter can open the lock.55 Authentication of a person’s
identity is, of course, a matter of real concern to police, who need to detect
escapees, bail jumpers, and other individuals who may have disguised their
identity. Photographs, fingerprints, iris scans, retinal patterns, DNA
who meets the statutory criteria) is an important but not a necessary trait of this family of
cases. See Kaye, supra note 48; see also infra Part II.
51
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966.
52
Id. at 1970 (emphasis added).
53
Although Justice Scalia claimed that this use of the term “identify” offended proper
English speech, id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting), speaking of investigation to identify a
culprit creates no dissonance with common parlance or statutory intent. The point that the
dissent was making was that laws authorizing DNA collection for “identification” have the
primary purpose to allow DNA to be used for identifying individuals to solve crimes, rather
than to inform decisions about pretrial custody or to create a permanent record for
authentication—although they do or can serve these purposes as well. But what follows
from this historical fact about legislative motivation is far less clear than the dissent
suggested. See infra Part II.
54
See Kaye, supra note 48, at 38.
55
Of course, any pattern recognition device (and especially ones based on a single
biometric) can be defeated by extreme measures—a point that has not been lost on writers of
thrillers. See generally, e.g., DAN BROWN, ANGELS AND DEMONS (2000) (imagining a
murder to obtain a body part to defeat a retina-scanning security system).
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polymorphisms, and still more biological traits can be used, singly or in
conjunction, for this purpose.56 There should be little doubt that DNA has
some value in a multimodal system for identifying arrestees with
biometrics.57
However, the Court did not claim that the state’s interest in
authentication-identification of suspects is sufficient to justify DNA-BC.
The majority also described what can be called “associationidentification.”58 The Court recognized that acquiring biometric data as a
marker or token of individual identity can lead to other information about
an individual.59 In particular, sometimes it can perform the criminalintelligence function of associating an individual with past or future crimes.
The major crime-solving power of a DNA profile that is distinctive to an
individual (or to a small number of people) comes from the ability to screen
a database of unsolved crime scene samples for matches to the arrestee’s
profile. In addition, the record of the arrestee’s DNA profile could be
useful in solving future crimes. A database of DNA profiles of suspected
terrorists is one such intelligence tool, as it can be used to inform analysts
of these suspects’ possible involvement in bombings or other incidents in
which DNA traces are found.60 In Justice Kennedy’s words:
A DNA profile is useful to the police because it gives them a form of identification to
search the records already in their valid possession. In this respect the use of DNA for
identification is no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a wanted poster of a
previously unidentified suspect; or matching tattoos to known gang symbols to reveal
a criminal affiliation; or matching the arrestee’s fingerprints to those recovered from a
crime scene.61

56

See, e.g., NANCY YUE LIU, BIO-PRIVACY: PRIVACY REGULATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE
38–44 (2012).
57
See ARUN A. ROSS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MULTIBIOMETRICS 22 (2006) (“[F]ingerprints
of a small fraction of the population may be unsuitable for automatic identification because
of genetic factors, aging, environmental or occupational reasons (e.g., manual workers may
have a large number of cuts and bruises on their fingerprints that keep changing).”).
58
See Kaye, supra note 48, at 44–45.
59
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972 (2013) (majority opinion) (“The task of
identification necessarily entails searching public and police records based on the identifying
information provided by the arrestee to see what is already known about him.”).
60
See David Johnston & James Risen, U.S. Forces Join Big Assault on an Afghan
Stronghold; One G.I. Killed; Others Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at A1 (“Law
enforcement officials cited [Richard] Reid’s case [who was accused of trying to blow up a
trans-Atlantic flight with explosives hidden in his shoes] as an example of how the databank
could be useful. Investigators discovered two human hairs embedded in a crude igniting
device in Reid’s shoes. The authorities said that the strands did not match Reid’s hair and
that if a DNA database existed, analysts could search it for a match and perhaps identify an
accomplice.”).
61
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972.
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Indeed, the Court insisted that with respect to trawling a database of
crime scene records, “the only difference between DNA analysis and the
accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA
provides.”62 The biometric data, whether they relate to friction-ridge skin
or to DNA molecules, can associate individuals with a crime scene or a
victim.63
But how, precisely, is this intelligence function of DNA-BC
constitutionally significant? Justice Kennedy did not simply write that the
contribution of DNA-BC to criminal intelligence is a legitimate and
powerful state interest because it permits criminal prosecutions for matters
unrelated to the original arrest. Instead, he reasoned that the intelligence
obtained from pretrial DNA database trawls was valuable (only?) because it
could help in the disposition of pretrial matters with respect to the crime for
which the defendant was arrested.64 The idea is that once officials discover
a recorded criminal history or an apparent involvement in an unsolved
crime—whether by fingerprints, DNA, or anything else—they can make
better “choices about how to proceed”65 with respect to the period and
nature of confinement.66 These choices are “critical,” and they implicate
62

Id.
“Trait identification” is yet another form of identification. Some DNA sequences (and
some fingerprint features) are correlated (to some extent) with other physical or mental traits.
However, the majority did not use the term “identification” to refer to analyzing DNA
sequences to infer phenotypes as opposed to ascertaining variations that differentiate an
individual’s DNA from almost everyone else’s. See Kaye, supra note 48, at 46.
64
See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972.
65
Id.
66
The opinion states that “DNA identification can provide untainted information to those
charged with detaining suspects and detaining the property of any felon.” Id. By revealing
“the type of person whom they are detaining, . . . DNA allows them to make critical choices
about how to proceed.” Id. “[L]ooking forward to future stages of criminal prosecution, ‘the
Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are
available for trials,’” and “[a] person who is arrested for one offense but knows that he has
yet to answer for some past crime may be more inclined to flee the instant charges, lest
continued contact with the criminal justice system expose one or more other serious
offenses.” Id. at 1972–73 (citation omitted). And beyond this possible influence on flight
risk, “an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to the
public, and this will inform a court’s determination whether the individual should be released
on bail.” Id. at 1973. “The government’s interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both
legitimate and compelling. . . . This interest is not speculative. . . . Present capabilities make
it possible to complete a DNA identification that provides information essential to
determining whether a detained suspect can be released pending trial.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although the majority’s analysis pertains only to using existing DNA loci as a token of
individual identity, one commentator believes that it means that most DNA database laws
authorize testing DNA samples for a postulated “pedophile gene” or a hypothetical “violence
gene”—because such postulated genes also could be useful in assessing dangerousness. Erin
63
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“legitimate,” “substantial,” and “compelling” interests involving pretrial
detention.67 Should a defendant be released before trial? On what
conditions? What plea bargain should a prosecutor be willing to consider?
Knowing that someone picked up for one offense may be guilty of even
more serious crimes is relevant to these pretrial matters.
But the Court’s analysis of the extent to which DNA-BC actually
furthers these interests is not especially probing. After all, many arrestees
already have criminal records.68 It is far from clear that law enforcement
officials often will discover nonredundant bail or jail-security-related
information from a DNA database trawl of arrestees. This deferential mode
of balancing, however, is nothing new. It typifies the Court’s handling of
special needs cases.69
More surprising is that the majority’s list of state interests omits the
very thing for which the DNA sample in King was used—to charge and
convict the defendant of an unrelated crime. The closest the Court comes to
acknowledging the state’s dominant objective of developing criminal
intelligence data that link arrestees to unsolved crimes is a short paragraph
stating that “[f]inally, in the interests of justice, the identification of an
arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous crime may have the salutary

Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127
HARV. L. REV. 161, 180 (2013). But it is clear that both the King majority opinion and the
statutes adopted well before King use the term “identification” only insofar as the DNA
authenticates an individual’s identity and produces further information through a database
trawl. To use these hypothetical genotypes to infer phenotypes would be to seek
“information beyond identification,” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979, as the Court used the phrase;
see also Kaye, supra note 48, at 46 (discussing the opinion’s use of the phrase and the
different meanings of “identification”); cf. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“[E]ven if . . . it is physically possible for the government to extract genetic traits
from the 13 loci, there is no evidence that the government could legally do so without further
legislation, or that the government has any intention of doing so.”), vacated as moot, 659
F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
67
See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–73.
68
In fiscal year 2001, about 60% of federal offenders had criminal history points as
defined in sentencing guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AND THE
“FIRST OFFENDER” 4 (2004), available at http://goo.gl/md1WF3. Over 40% of state felony
defendants in large counties had at least one prior felony conviction. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, BULLETIN: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 (May 2010),
http://goo.gl/NJYjmE. Of course, the percentage with prior criminal histories would be
lower among individuals who are merely arrested, and not later tried or convicted.
69
See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 254, 296 (2011) (“[T]he reasonableness standard currently in use is unnecessarily
broad and too deferential to the government. Courts define the governmental interests
broadly and the privacy interests narrowly, such that in practice the balancing test operates
as a form of rational basis review under which the government presumptively wins.”).

548

DAVID H. KAYE

[Vol. 104

effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same offense.”70 If
the Court is willing to allow balancing at all, why was it not willing to place
on the scale the state’s interest in determining whether arrestees might be
associated with other crimes so that they can be charged with those
crimes?71
Having articulated at least a subset of all the state interests in DNABC, the Court had to weigh them against the individual interests that
underlie the Fourth Amendment. First, the Court depicted the state’s
interests as substantial. Properly processing arrestees, it stressed, is not
only “legitimate,”72 but also “is so important [that it] has consequences for
every stage of the criminal process.”73 Next, the Court perceived a close
link between these interests and “DNA identification,” which “represents an
important advance in the techniques used by law enforcement to serve
legitimate police concerns.”74 Indeed, the Court insisted that “DNA
identification is an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting in many
ways, so much so that to insist on fingerprints as the norm would make little
sense to either the forensic expert or a layperson.”75 But the opinion
pointed to only one superior aspect of DNA profiling for authentication: its
power to confound the “suspect who has changed his facial features to
evade photographic identification or even one who has undertaken the more
arduous task of altering his fingerprints.”76 Moreover, the Court did not
mention the inability of normal DNA profiling to distinguish between
monozygotic twins (who represent roughly 8 individuals per 1,000).77 In
that regard at least, fingerprints are superior.78
On the other side of the ledger, the Court perceived no significant
“intrusion upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that associated with
70
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974. The opinion also states, more cryptically, that “knowing
identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.”
Id. at 1972.
71
One explanation might be that the majority wanted to avoid an opinion that would pave
the way for population-wide DNA sampling. See infra Part III.A. Another is that the Court did
not see fit to question the common understanding of the special needs line of cases as resting on
an inquiry into the dominant purpose of a program alleged to advance an immediate interest
other than the investigation and prosecution of criminals. See infra Part II.
72
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970.
73
Id. at 1974.
74
Id. at 1975.
75
Id. at 1976.
76
Id.
77
See Jeroen Smits & Christiaan Monden, Twinning Across the Developing World, 6
PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2011), http://goo.gl/GaVmHl (“[A]bout 4 in 1000 births [are] known to be
monozygotic across the globe.”).
78
See Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN
RECOGNITION 2653, 2661–62 (2002).
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fingerprinting.”79 The sampling procedure itself—the “cheek swab”—is a
minimal [intrusion].”80 Neither do the details of King’s “13 CODIS loci . . .
intrude on . . . privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification
unconstitutional.”81 After all, “alleles at the CODIS loci are not at present
revealing information beyond identification,”82 and “even if non-coding
alleles could provide some information, they are not in fact tested for that
end.”83 Under Maryland’s law, “[a] person may not willfully test a DNA
sample for information that does not relate to the identification of
individuals.”84
Thus, “[i]n light of the scientific and statutory
safeguards, . . . the STR analysis of respondent’s DNA pursuant to CODIS
procedures did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy”85 when
compared to the value of DNA-BC for pretrial authentication of identity
and informed decisionmaking about arrestees.
In sum, the Court rejected the need to find a categorical exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements. It regarded photographing,
fingerprinting, and DNA profiling of arrestees as comparable actions amply
justified by the utility of these biometrics in establishing the true identity of
the individual (authentication-identification) and learning whether he might
be responsible for other crimes (intelligence, or association-identification).
But the analysis was oddly truncated. The majority did not present the
intelligence function as an important weapon in catching criminals. It only
relied on DNA profiling of arrestees as a source of information for pretrial
decisions about detention for the crimes that triggered the arrests.
C. THE DISSENT’S SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH DOCTRINE

Like the majority, the four dissenters recognized that “free-form”
balancing is not generally available,86 but they drew the line at a different
79

King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974.
Id. at 1977.
81
Id. at 1979.
82
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1980 (citation omitted).
85
Id. “STR analysis” refers to ascertaining the lengths of certain DNA sequences
composed of “short tandem repeats” of a core of several nucleotide bases. One individual
might have four repeats of a particular STR at a site on one chromosome (a “locus”) and six
on the other chromosome. A different individual could have the pair seven and eleven. The
list of the pairs of numbers for thirteen such loci is the CODIS profile. See id. at 1968; see
also JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 154–57 (2010).
86
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan used the term “freeform balancing” during oral argument, telling the deputy solicitor general that such
balancing is “typically not the way we do it.” Transcript, supra note 28, at 25. The phrase
does not occur in any opinion before King, according to my research, although the adjective
80
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point. Justice Scalia’s opinion asserted that “[t]he Fourth Amendment
forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for
believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of
incriminating evidence. . . . Whenever this Court has allowed a
suspicionless search, it has insisted upon a justifying motive apart from the
investigation of crime.”87 The dissent then argued, caustically and
convincingly, that the Maryland legislature was not thinking primarily (if at
all) about things like setting bail and catching escapees who may have
changed their other biometric features when it expanded its DNA
databanking law to encompass arrestees.88 Those lawmakers aimed to
enhance the efficacy of the state database in catching criminals by using it
to associate the unidentified crime scene samples with a larger collection of
known samples (from arrestees and from the previous base of convicted
offenders). And that the Constitution forbids—no matter how minor the
intrusion on the person and on privacy—for the Fourth Amendment
“prohibition [on suspicionless searches] is categorical and without
exception.”89
As a descriptive matter, the dissent’s broad claim that “a suspicionless
search” is permissible only when there is “a justifying motive apart from
the investigation of crime”90 is inaccurate. Within the PSUWE framework,
the existence of interests beyond generating information and evidence in
criminal investigations does trigger balancing. This balancing almost
always enables the Court to uphold programs for special needs or
administrative searches, such as fire and safety inspections, without
individualized suspicion of any code violations,91 or the compulsory testing
of all high school athletes for drug usage.92 Moreover, the Court has said
that if the program of searches or seizures is not designed primarily to
advance special interests, then this special needs balancing is not
available.93
“free-form” appears pejoratively in a few opinions on different topics. See, e.g., McQuiggin
v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1940 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing “free-form
improvisation” in interpreting a statute); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion) (rejecting “[f]reeform notions of fundamental fairness
divorced from traditional practice” in analyzing claims of jurisdiction).
87
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88
See id. at 1985–86.
89
Id. at 1980.
90
Id.
91
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539–40 (1967).
92
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995); see also infra Part
II.A.
93
See infra Part II.B (describing the two cases in which the Court has declined to engage
in special needs balancing on this basis).
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That is why, to the consternation of the dissent,94 the majority did not
present DNA-BC as falling into the special needs category.95 The majority
ventured outside the PSUWE framework entirely—as the Court has done
on a few previous occasions. In Illinois v. Lidster96 and again in Samson v.
California,97 the Court upheld suspicionless searches or seizures whose
primary purpose—indeed, whose solitary purpose—was to develop
investigatory leads or to find evidence of guilt.98 These cases are
exceptions to any putative rule that suspicionless searches or seizures
cannot have evidence production as their primary purpose.
In Lidster, the police were looking for a driver who had struck and
killed a seventy-year-old bicyclist.99 Police cars with flashing lights forced
motorists to stop to be asked whether they had seen anything the previous
weekend—when the accident occurred—that might help them identify this
person.100 As Robert Lidster’s minivan approached the checkpoint, it
nearly hit one of the officers.101 Lidster failed a sobriety test and was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.102 The Appellate Court
of Illinois reversed the conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed.103
These courts reasoned that the primary purpose exception to the special
needs exception,104 articulated in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,105
rendered the stop unconstitutional.106
That decision seemed correct. In Edmond, police established a
roadblock to check for illegal drugs with a drug-sniffing dog.107 In Lidster,
they instituted a roadblock to discover the identity of the hit-and-run

94

See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1982 n.1.
See id. at 1978–79 (majority opinion).
96
540 U.S. 419 (2004).
97
547 U.S. 843 (2006).
98
See id. at 847; Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423. Lidster is usually considered to be a special
needs case. See infra note 117. On the view taken here—that searches or seizures for the
sake of learning about crimes or generating evidence for use at a trial constitute the
canonical law enforcement activity for which a warrant or probable cause normally is
required—this conventional classification is incorrect.
99
See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 422–23.
104
This limitation on the special needs exception is discussed infra Part II.B.
105
531 U.S. 32, 41–42, 48 (2000).
106
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.
107
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35–36. The Court had just held in Illinois v. Caballes that a
dog’s promenade around a car is not a search. 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). What triggered the
Fourth Amendment in the first place was only the stop of the vehicle. See id.
95
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driver.108 In both cases, it was undeniable that the sole purpose of the
roadblock was to discover evidence of a crime. In Lidster, however, the
Supreme Court brushed aside the argument that the actual primary purpose
of the program barred direct balancing. Considering “context” and
“circumstances”109—including the small amount of time it took for the
stop110 and the limited nature of the questioning111—the Court held the
roadblock constitutional via free-form balancing.112
In choosing to balance outside the special needs category, the Lidster
Court emphasized that the roadblock represented only a minor invasion of
the motorists’ interests.113 Justice Scalia did not assert then, as he later did
in King, that “[n]o matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches
are never allowed if their principal end is ordinary crime-solving.”114 To
the contrary, he joined the majority opinion in full. At that time, Justice
Scalia apparently was willing to utilize the degree of invasiveness as a
factor in deciding whether to balance. So too, the Court in Samson,115 again
with Justice Scalia’s approval, upheld a police officer’s search of the
clothing of a parolee—even though the officer had neither a special need to
search the person nor a pretense of individualized suspicion.116
To be sure, these cases can be distinguished from King. In Lidster,
“[t]he police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not
the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.”117 In contrast, DNA-BC
108

Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422. Asking questions or distributing a flyer, as occurred in
Lidster, is not a search. Id. at 428; see also id. at 425 (“[T]he law ordinarily permits police
to seek the voluntary cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a crime.”);
id. at 426 (“[I]t would seem anomalous were the law (1) ordinarily to allow police freely to
seek the voluntary cooperation of pedestrians but (2) ordinarily to forbid police to seek
similar voluntary cooperation from motorists.”). As in Edmond, the only Fourth
Amendment interest at stake in Lidster was freedom of movement. See id. at 427–28.
109
Id. at 424–26.
110
Id. at 426 (“After all, as we have said, the motorist stop will likely be brief. Any
accompanying traffic delay should prove no more onerous than many that typically
accompany normal traffic congestion.”).
111
Id. at 425 (“The police are not likely to ask questions designed to elicit selfincriminating information.”).
112
Id. at 428.
113
Id. at 424 (“Neither do we believe, Edmond aside, that the Fourth Amendment would
have us apply an Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to brief, informationseeking highway stops of the kind now before us.”).
114
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
116
Id. at 857.
117
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423. This may be why Lidster is regarded conventionally as a
special needs case. See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“Applying the special needs doctrine, the Lidster Court upheld the constitutionality of a
checkpoint whose primary purpose was to gather information from motorists who might
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seeks information that could incriminate many of the arrestees even if, as in
Lidster, that is not the expectation in every, or even the majority, of the
cases. As for Samson, one can limit its reach by insisting that parolees
simply forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights.118 But that it is not how
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in Samson presents the result,119 and
the King dissent’s theory of a “prohibition that is categorical and without
exception” and that “lies at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment”120 is
not an accurate statement of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
When considering routine, suspicionless DNA collection for database
trawls, especially but not exclusively after conviction, a great many judges
in state and federal courts alike were convinced that a categorical rule like
the dissent’s rule was not a barrier to such DNA collection.121
The dissent’s theory certainly would have simplified matters, but the
law before, and now after, King is not so simple. Figure 1 shows the more
complex current state of affairs.122 It supplies a more complete picture of
have witnessed a fatal hit-and-run accident the week before.”); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond
Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to
Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 373 (2012)
(referring to Lidster as “an earlier special needs case”); Kit Kinports, Camreta and al-Kidd:
The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment, and Witnesses, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
283, 306 (2012) (analyzing the reach of “the special need recognized” in Lidster). The
perception is that questioning members of the public to gather information on crimes in
which they were not known to be involved is a special need. On this understanding,
however, it is arguable, as the Second Circuit determined in Amerson, 483 F.3d at 82–83,
and Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2005), that creating a DNA database
is also a special need. The point of a DNA database system, like the dragnet questioning of
the many motorists in Lidster, is to yield information about crimes when those who are
subject to the program are not known to be associated with the crimes.
118
During the oral argument in King, Justice Sotomayor stated “[a]s I read Samson, it
was the special relationship between the parolee or the probationary person, that line of
cases, and the assumption being that they’re out in the world, I think, by the largesse of the
State,” and that therefore “a State has a right to search their home, just as it would their cell,
essentially.” Transcript, supra note 28, at 11.
119
The opinion pursued a more extended balancing. It did not stop with the observation
that “[e]xamining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a
parolee . . . including [but not limited to] the plain terms of the parole search condition, we
conclude that petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize
as legitimate.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 852. It also enumerated “substantial” state interests. Id.
at 853–55.
120
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121
See, e.g., Kaye, “Considered Analysis,” supra note 17, at 114–17 (criticizing the
readiness of three such courts to balance rather than to apply a categorical rule). See
generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State
DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R. 5th 239 (2005).
122
The final category applies not to the decision to search or seize, but to the manner in
which a search or seizure is implemented. The category includes, for instance, ad hoc
balancing to avoid “excessive force” in the execution of an arrest or search warrant, e.g., Los
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when the Court uses balancing to establish Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.123 To support Justice Scalia’s theory for suspicionless
searches, we would have to eliminate parts of the direct-balancing branch of
the case law. This pruning might be desirable, but the dissent offered no
normatively grounded defense of its no-suspicionless-search rule.124

Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (“In executing a search warrant
officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and ensure their own safety . . .
[but] unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force[.]”), and “unreasonably
burdensome” administrative demands for documents, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 544 (1967) ( “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that the [agency] subpoena . . . not be
unreasonably burdensome.”).
123
For discussion of specific cases in which the Court has balanced, see generally David
H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory]; Kaye,
“Considered Analysis,” supra note 17.
124
Cf. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1118 (maintaining that
Samson and Knights are anomalous departures from the PSUWE framework).
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Figure 1
Situations Where Balancing Determines
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
To define a categorical
exception for lesser
intrusions or exigenciesa
Within PSUWE framework
Administrative or special
needs programsb

Reasonableness
Direct balancing

Parolees and probationersc

Discretionless automobile
stops for brief questioning
about a past eventd
Discretionless DNA
sampling after an arreste
Conducting a search or
seizuref

a

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“When faced with
such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular
context.”).
c
See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 121–22 (2001).
d
See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004).
e
See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013).
f
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
b
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Because the dissent dismissed the majority’s “free-form
reasonableness” analysis as impermissible, it did not directly question the
details of that balancing or argue that, in a sensible and complete balancing
of the relevant state and individual interests, the latter should prevail. In
fact, the dissent objected to the balancing precisely because it thought that
such balancing must justify far more than the collection of DNA from
arrestees.125
At the same time, the dissent did maintain that arrestee databasing, as
actually practiced in Maryland and elsewhere, was inconsistent with the
purposes the majority ascribed to DNA-BC. The state did not collect the
sample, analyze it, and upload the profile all as part of the booking
process.126 Days, weeks, and months went by before the state completed
this process. King’s profile was not checked against the existing offender
and arrestee indices to see whether he was who he claimed to be. For the
dissent, the fact that “DNA . . . was [not] used for identification [in the
sense of authentication] here”127 was dispositive. The dissent doubted that
“the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so
eager to open their mouths for royal inspection,”128 and that was that.
II. DOCTRINAL ALTERNATIVES: A CLOSER LOOK AT PSUWE AND THE
DEMISE OF THE WARRANT-PREFERENCE RULE
Although the King Court rejected the need to find a categorical
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements for searches, this
Article has shown that doing so did not breach a previously impermeable
barrier to balancing outside of the PSUWE framework. But the very
permeability of the barrier is worrisome. The family resemblance theory of
when to balance is intrinsically vague,129 and excluding the value of DNA
databases for criminal investigations in the subsequent balancing strains
credulity because it is disconnected from the dominant legislative purpose
and the use to which King’s profile was put. This Part therefore outlines
less contrived defenses of DNA-BC under the Fourth Amendment. In
addition, it offers a conceptualization of the case law that is less convoluted
than the Court’s current off-again, on-again PSUWE framework.
A court determined to uphold DNA sampling before conviction could
have dealt with the per se rule in four ways. First, it could have replaced
the PSUWE framework with universal free-form balancing—a universe in
125
126
127
128
129

See infra Part III.
See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1983–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1988–89.
Id. at 1989.
See supra Part I.A.
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which courts always look at all relevant factors and circumstances bearing
on the reasonableness of a search or seizure without worrying about
categorical rules.130 Second, the Court could have found a niche for DNABC programs, such as Maryland’s, within the special needs exception.
Third, the Court could have explicitly created a new, sui generis exception
for collecting and using DNA samples (and other biometric data) from
arrestees. Finally, considering the differences between biometric-data
acquisition and use and traditional searches, it could have explicitly
recognized a broader categorical exception for acquiring and using certain
types of biometric data, including DNA identification profiles, in a program
with sufficient privacy safeguards. Instead of adopting any of these
approaches, the Court implicitly, and awkwardly, created a new specialneeds-type exception for DNA-BC programs. Let us examine just what the
King Court did—and what it might have done—more carefully.
A. DISCARDING THE PER SE RULE

In theory, the Court could have adopted a new regime in which every
case involves a direct inquiry into the reasonableness of the search or
seizure under all the case-specific circumstances. This “no lines” regime,
as it has been called,131 would resemble that of tort cases in which juries are
asked to use their best judgment to decide whether the defendant’s conduct
was unreasonable.132 If this is what “free-form balancing” means, then the
King Court did not embrace it. Rather, King’s balancing incorporated only
the state’s special (non-crime-solving) interests, and the Court did not
question the need for categorical exceptions in most cases. The opinions
thus do little to resolve two overlapping debates about the meaning of
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment and the need for the PSUWE
framework. This Section explains the two intersecting debates and their
relationship to the decision to balance in King.

130

See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1471 (1985).
131
See id.
132
See id. Many other analogies are apt. See Lee, supra note 35, at 1133–34
(analogizing to “the requirement in criminal law that a person claiming self-defense must
have reasonably believed that the force used was necessary” to prevent an attack). For
another example, in probable cause inquiries, judges must decide when “there is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); see also Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable
Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 649–50 (2009) (analyzing the
differences between traditional probable cause and the less demanding showing of
reasonable suspicion required for investigatory stops and frisks).
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1. Reasonabilists and Warrantists
Some Justices have spoken of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as a
no-lines regime,133 and commentators have disagreed on the proper reading
of the relevant text and history of the Amendment. The Amendment
protects personal security134 with two parallel clauses:
[1] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and [2] no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.135

The first clause bars unreasonable searches and seizures; the second
requires that warrants be based on probable cause. But the Amendment is
silent on how the two clauses interact,136 the historical record is “foggy,”137

133
As Justice Frank Murphy framed this view in United States v. Rabinowitz, “[t]he
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances—the
total atmosphere of the case.” 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). For more recent incarnations of the
case-specific view of reasonableness, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006);
Kaye, “Considered Analysis,” supra note 17, at 115–17 (discussing three opinions by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist).
134
See generally Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From
Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2012) (arguing that more robust protection
would flow “from a traditional concern with the security of persons, houses, papers, and
effects” rather than the Warren Court’s “innovative analysis centered on the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures”); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV.
101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the core value of the Fourth Amendment is the interest in
personal security rather than the privacy of information); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 394, 446 (1995) (maintaining that the
Fourth Amendment is meant to limit “coercion and violence”). But see STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 130 (2012) (asserting that the core of the Fourth Amendment is “the right to
control knowledge about our personal lives, the right to decide how much information gets
revealed to whom and for which purposes”); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23–26 (2007) (contending
that privacy is a central Fourth Amendment value).
135
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
136
Competing theories are described in, for example, Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’
Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1061 (2011)
(rejecting the notion that the Amendment was “designed solely to ban general warrants”);
Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container
Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403,
1409–14 (2010) (explaining that the warrant preference view of the Fourth Amendment
views the two clauses “as interconnected, one giving meaning to the other”).
137
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1969); see
also Maclin & Mirabella, supra note 32, at 1063, 1064–67 (describing “areas of
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and the scholarly literature divided.138 Reasonabilists insist that the two
clauses are separate and distinct. All the Amendment seems to require is
that a search be reasonable and that warrants, when they are sought, be
based on probable cause.139 Consequently, Reasonabilists could accept the
no-lines model as consistent with the framing of the Amendment.
Warrantists read the clauses together so that warrantless searches are
generally unreasonable.140 They maintain that in every case in which it is
feasible to obtain a warrant based on probable cause, it is necessary to do
so.141 Therefore, Warrantists would reject a standard that treats warrantless
searches as reasonable when no good reason for dispensing with the warrant
is apparent.142
2. Balancers and Categorizers
The now-dominant Reasonabilist interpretation of the text of the
Fourth Amendment and the statements of various Justices that “the ultimate
disagreement” in the leading historical analysts’ understandings of the Framers’ views
regarding reasonableness and warrantless searches).
138
See Clancy, supra note 136, at 982–89; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 552–53 (1999) (challenging the historical
foundations of both of “the two currently competing constructions of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness: the more conventional warrant-preference construction, which treats the
warrant process as the central protection called for by the Amendment, and the generalizedreasonableness construction, which rejects the need for, or value of, warrants”); Tracey
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV.
925, 928–29 (1997) (arguing that history supports the “warrant preference rule”); David E.
Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 267 (2005) (“The historical record actually supports a third
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, different from both the warrant preference rule and
Professor Amar’s reasonableness approach.
Specifically, the framers enacted the
amendment solely to regulate house searches.”).
139
The leading modern expositor of this position is Professor Akhil Amar. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 64–77 (1998); Amar,
supra note 45, at 759; Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First
Principles]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1178–81 (1991).
140
See, e.g., Davies, supra note 138, at 559 (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the
Supreme Court has endorsed what is now called the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in which the use of a valid warrant . . . is the salient
factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”).
141
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[P]olice must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.”).
142
This would be the position of a Total Warrantist. See, e.g., McCommon v.
Mississippi, 474 U.S. 984, 986 n.* (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of petition
for writ of certiorari) (referring in a footnote to “[his] view that automobile searches
presenting no exigent circumstances should be fully subject to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement”).
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touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”143 are not
necessarily equivalent to advocacy of universal, ad hoc balancing.144
Overlapping the Reasonabilist–Warrantist debate—and easily confused
with the division between the two groups—is the pervasive tension between
Balancers and Categorizers.145 Balancers prefer flexible standards, like
reasonableness or utility. Categorizers seek to constrain discretion with
more rigid rules crafted to promote the ultimate goals. Inevitably, rules are
too broad or too narrow, but on average, they may perform better than
giving fallible judges license to balance on ad hoc bases. Consequently,
even a Reasonabilist construction of the Fourth Amendment can produce a
system in which warrants are required unless a categorical exception
provides otherwise. The situation is similar to the defense of moral rules by
utilitarians. The “rule utilitarian” believes that moral questions are best
resolved by a system of rules that are calculated to maximize utility and that
do not permit every moral agent to decide which acts are, all things
considered, utility-maximizing.146
Likewise, a Fourth Amendment
143

Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Professor Murphy presents the
“touchstone” sentence found in Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013), as a
“remarkable” signal of “the demise of the warrant standard.” Murphy, supra note 66, at 184.
Yet, the “touchstone” statement appears in opinions extending back to Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977). Mimms used the statement to apply a modified
version of the stop-and-frisk exception inaugurated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to an
aspect of an automobile stop. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. That is, Mimms held it was
reasonable, as a safety precaution, for police to order a person driving with an expired
license plate and lawfully stopped for a traffic summons to get out of the automobile, id. at
111–12, even though “the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular
driver at the time of the stop,” id. at 109. Echoing Terry, the Court perceived that the
intrusion on “the driver’s personal liberty” (in having to stand outside the vehicle for a short
time) paled in comparison to the interest of the police in avoiding “unnecessary risks in the
performance of their duties.” Id. at 110–11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
144
For commentary that may conflate the issue of across-the-board balancing with the
separate-clauses construction of the Fourth Amendment, see Kaye, A Fourth Amendment
Theory, supra note 123, at 1101–04; Murphy, supra note 66, at 183–87.
145
On balancing and classifying in other fields of law, see, for example, Daniel A.
Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 50
(2007); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 912–16 (1963); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577, 590 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–95 (1992).
146
The “act utilitarian” judges the morality of an action by ascertaining its utility, all
things considered. The “rule utilitarian” relies on a set of rules thought to approximate the
results of ad hoc judgments. The rule utilitarian can invoke the principle of utility to create a
generic exception to a rule, but regardless of his intuition about what a direct assessment of
utility would show in the particular case, he may not depart from the applicable rule on an ad
hoc basis. See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://goo.gl/yUOAzV.
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Reasonabilist can favor a rule that (1) allows warrantless searches of certain
types and (2) forbids warrantless searches that do not fall into these
categories.
3. The Modern PSUWE Framework
Before King, Reasonabilists and Warrantists both spoke of a per se
rule with exceptions, but they battled on two fronts. One front was whether
to construe the varied exceptions to the warrant requirement expansively to
permit the police to search without a warrant, without probable cause, or
even without particularized suspicion in certain types of cases. The
Reasonabilists won the battle. They achieved victory by expanding the
categorical exceptions. They built the exceptions into walls that remained
unbreachable, even when a warrant easily could have been obtained in the
particular case.147
The overbroad categorical exceptions have been the target of much
criticism, but the disagreements over where to place the boundaries of the
exceptions have not replaced the system of categorical exceptions with a
negligence-law-like universe of ad hoc balancing. Both before and after
King, a court must ask whether a search is of the type that falls under a
categorical exception.148 If it does, the search is deemed reasonable,
whether or not police could have obtained a warrant in the particular

147

See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1985) (applying the moving-vehicle
exception devised in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925), to a motor home
parked for an extended period near a courthouse). As Justice Sotomayor explained in
Missouri v. McNeely, “[w]e have recognized a limited class of traditional exceptions to the
warrant requirement that apply categorically and thus do not require an assessment of
whether the policy justifications underlying the exception, which may include exigencybased considerations, are implicated in a particular case.” 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013)
(citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1991) (automobile exception); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224–35 (1973) (searches incident to arrest)). In contrast,
the McNeely Court treated “the general exigency exception, which asks whether an
emergency existed that justified a warrantless search” as one that “naturally calls for a casespecific inquiry.” Id. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito advanced the
following understanding of the exigent circumstances exception in drunk driving cases:
“[T]here may be time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn. If there is, an officer
must seek a warrant. If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not, the exigent
circumstances exception applies . . . and the blood may be drawn without a warrant.” Id. at
1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This proposed rule for “the
general exigency exception” is the one that a Total Warrantist would apply to all searches.
148
As indicated in Figure 1, the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted is
subject to case-specific balancing. Application of the exigent circumstances exception does
not entail ad hoc balancing, but under McNeely, it is a case-specific rather than a categorical
exception. See discussion supra note 147.

562

DAVID H. KAYE

[Vol. 104

case.149 To this extent, the reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment
has prevailed over an “almost universal warrant requirement.”150
The other front in the Warrantist–Reasonabilist struggle pertains to
situations in which the government ventures outside the ramparts of the
categorical exceptions.
Are these searches or seizures always
unreasonable?151 Or are there cases in which it is appropriate to balance to
find reasonableness without a simple exception? For traditional evidenceor contraband-related searches or seizures, the answer remains in the
affirmative—an established exception is required or a new one must be
recognized.152 Although at oral argument Justice Kennedy toyed with the
thought that DNA collection on arrest was a search incident to arrest,153 he
149

See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 1146 (“If the government engages in a warrantless
search and that search satisfies the requirements of a well-delineated exception to the
warrant requirement, it too will be presumed reasonable.”).
150
Bradley, supra note 130, at 1494. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman,
Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2012) (urging adoption of an
overarching warrant requirement); William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of
the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant
Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1994) (observing that the Court’s use of balancing in
cases since Justice Stewart’s departure has undermined the per se rule).
151
Qualifiers like “presumptively,” “generally,” and “ordinarily” commonly modify the
Court’s statements of the per se rule, but these terms merely may refer to the possibility of an
exception. For example, in Groh v. Ramirez, the Court wrote that “our cases have firmly
established the ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). Payton v. New York, however,
includes a footnote explaining “presumptively unreasonable” as follows: “a search or seizure
carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the
police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the
presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’” 445 U.S. at 586 n.25 (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971)).
152
Consistent with the function of the warrant and probable cause requirements,
balancing is always available to recognize a new exception or refine the boundaries of an
already established one. In developing these standard exceptions, relevant considerations
include the severity of the intrusion on the person or property, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (dismissing as “de minimis” a driver’s interest in
remaining inside a validly stopped car); the practicality of seeking a warrant, see, e.g.,
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (“Our decisions have recognized that a
warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.”); and the value of
screening for probable cause (or a lesser degree of individualized suspicion) by a magistrate;
see, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) (finding no
need “to interpose a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer”
when there are “no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.”).
153
Transcript, supra note 28, at 26 (asking the deputy solicitor general why this is not a
search incident to arrest “just like taking the pockets out and . . . seeing what’s in the
person’s overcoat and so forth”). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, may have described the
exception too narrowly. Id. at 27 (suggesting that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine only
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wisely veered away from that idea in the opinion.154 DNA sampling is not
required to protect the arresting officer or to prevent the destruction of
evidence.155
Nevertheless, in the last half century, the Court has upheld as
reasonable one type of search after another, the abject absence of probable
cause or a warrant notwithstanding.156 Drug tests in schools157 and in the
workplace,158 roadblocks to get drunk drivers off the roads,159 inspections of
fire-damaged premises,160 and periodic searches of jail cells,161 for example,
do not require probable cause and a warrant. The common theme of these
cases is that the government’s interests go beyond the production of
evidence for use in a criminal investigation or prosecution. In ordinary
cases, in which the only point of the search is to generate such evidence or
to seize contraband or stolen items, a warrant (or, conceivably, a brand-new
exception) is still required. As such, the PSUWE framework has not been
replaced with a no-lines standard. But in those cases in which an additional
interest—including law enforcement interests relating to confining
prisoners—is present, the Court asks whether the state’s interests outweigh
the invasion of the individual interest in being free from arbitrary or
oppressive searches.162
Although the administrative and special needs searches often are
presented as if they comprise a single exception, they represent a category
of exceptions rather than a single categorical exception. The presence of an
administrative system or a special need is nothing more than a potential
reason to recognize new, discrete exceptions. Weighty interests beyond or
allows police to search for weapons and “material that relates to the crime for which the
person has been arrested”). The deputy solicitor general corrected both Justices. Id. at 26–
27 (calling Justice Scalia’s construction “inaccurate” because the search-incident-to-arrest
exception allows a “full search of the person for any destructible evidence,” and “[t]he crime
of arrest limitation . . . [only] relates to cars”).
154
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013). The dissent easily showed that the
practice does not fit into the exception established for searches incident arrest. See id. at
1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155
These two concerns define the scope of the search incident to arrest exception.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
156
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (enumerating four
such situations).
157
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
158
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
159
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
160
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984) (plurality opinion); cf. Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–38 (1967) (inspections for compliance with a housing code
pursuant to area-wide warrants did not require individualized suspicion).
161
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979).
162
See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1108.
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other than the investigation or prosecution of crimes provide a license to
create additional categorical exceptions—by balancing. For example, an
exception for vehicle checkpoints near the border flows from a special
need—controlling entry to the country.163 So does an exception for random
searches of a prisoner’s cell—to remove contraband that poses threats to
prison discipline or security.164 These specific exceptions are two of the
many distinct special needs exceptions that categorically justify causeless,
warrantless searches.165
Seen in this light, the PSUWE framework requires a court to look
through more than twenty discrete exceptions of varying degrees of
precision, some for criminal law enforcement evidence searches and others
for administrative or special needs searches.166 If none of these exceptions
apply, the search is unreasonable unless it differs from traditional searches
for contraband or evidence of a crime in a way that justifies a new
exception.
King is broadly consistent with this PSUWE framework. It does not
liberate courts to weigh interests ab initio in light of the totality of the
circumstances in every case.167 Had the majority wished to discard the
PSUWE framework in this wholesale manner, it would not have needed to
cobble together a set of purely detention-related state interests. Had the
Court wished to dispose of the per se rule in toto, it could have relied on the
unusual power of DNA databases to produce leads with which to apprehend
wrongdoers and evidence with which to convict them. The Court did
neither of these things. Instead, it left the PSUWE framework intact, at
least with respect to the existence of categorical exceptions that avoid the
163

See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–62 (1976); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
164
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012).
165
The cases establish categorical exceptions when they uphold whole types of searches
or seizures without regard to the specific facts of each case falling under the program in
question. Thus, certain kinds of roadblocks, drug tests of employees, searches of students’
property, inspections of jail cells, DNA-BC, and much more are permissible without a
warrant and probable cause when the program authorizing this official conduct meets certain
criteria for each exception.
166
See Bradley, supra note 132, at 1473–74 (cataloging the exceptions as of 1985).
167
King does not empower courts to consider, for example, the nature of the specific
crime they are seeking to solve in deciding whether a particular warrantless search of a
container is constitutional. Although it surely is more important to solve a robbery-murder
case by searching a suspect for the wallet that the killer stole than to ascertain a joyrider’s
identity by searching the same suspect for the key to the car, the gravity of the incident
motivating the search is not part of the inquiry into the reasonableness of the search. Instead
of adopting this kind of ad hoc balancing for all cases, the Court employed the programmatic
balancing used in special interest cases for the Maryland practice of preconviction DNA
collection and analysis. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013).
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need for a particularized showing that a warrant was not feasible. And, it
tried to confine its strategy of sidestepping the PSUWE framework as
applied to searches or searches outside of the usual safe harbors to cases
bearing some family resemblance to some special needs cases.
The opinion suggests that the most recognizable family trait is that
“the search involves no discretion that could properly be limited by the
‘interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law
enforcement officer.’”168 As in the case of a policy that always requires
inventory searches of arrestees, a magistrate has nothing to decide with
regard to mandatory DNA sampling. This rationale for dispensing with
warrants applies in various special needs cases, like the inventory search
(even though it is preceded by a discretionary decision to make an arrest).169
It also applies to Lidster, in which the roadblock for solving the hit-and-run
case applied to all drivers,170 rendering pointless a magistrate’s judgment of
whether any given driver had done anything wrong or had pertinent
knowledge. But the other two direct-balancing cases, Samson and Knights,
are members of the family that do not share this feature,171 leaving the
boundaries of the non-PSUWE cases obscure.
Although claims that King has abolished the PSUWE framework are
premature, the Court’s continued willingness to step outside the PSUWE
framework on rare occasions is problematic. It complicates what should be
a more straightforward analytical framework, and excessive use of the
escape mechanism of direct balancing in an ill-defined set of non-specialneeds cases would undermine the PSUWE framework.
Consequently, there are good reasons to consider alternatives that are
less anomalous than the King Court’s resort to direct balancing in lieu of
explicitly creating a new categorical exception. The next Section shows
how the Court could have created the same sui generis exception for DNABC without stepping outside the special needs category. Then, the final
Section in this Part indicates how it could have embraced a still broader
categorical exception.

168

Id. at 1969 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667
(1989)). When this condition exists, “[t]he need for a warrant is perhaps least.” Id.
169
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (stating that “standardized
inventory procedures are appropriate”).
170
See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004).
171
Both cases resulted from an isolated search after an individual aroused a police
officer’s suspicion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846–47 (2006); United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2001).
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B. SPECIAL NEEDS BALANCING

Authentication-identification is a special need. It permits jailers,
judges, and prosecutors to know whether an arrestee has a criminal
record—not because the record is evidence of guilt in the current case—but
because it is relevant to administrative and judicial decisions about the need
for and nature of pretrial confinement. This is the purpose given such great
weight by the King majority.172 Having a permanent biometric record
serves sundry other interests as well.173
Yet, both Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion stated that King did not fall into the special needs
category. Two relatively recent cases created a stumbling block. In these
cases, the Court declared the exception inapplicable if criminal evidence
collection was the primary purpose of the program of searches. One case,
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,174 which we encountered in Part I.C,
involved road blocks and dogs trained to detect drugs. The other, Ferguson
v. City of Charleston,175 was a program developed by law enforcement
authorities at the suggestion of a hospital to test pregnant women’s urine for
drug metabolites and to use the criminal law to coerce women into drug
counseling.176 However, these cases are distinguishable from King in that
the “primary purpose” of ordinary law enforcement—gathering evidence
suitable for prosecutions—was their only purpose. The Court has never
decided whether the same result should apply when the program truly
serves multiple purposes.177
If special needs balancing is available for single purpose searches, it
also should be available for multipurpose ones. Consider two search
programs that differ only in this regard: Program 1 serves special interests
without advancing the ordinary law enforcement interest of producing
evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions; Program 2 serves
special interests plus law enforcement interests. Ceteris paribus, Program 2
must be the more reasonable. The government interests are stronger, and
the premise that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment already struck the
balance in favor of warrants and probable cause applies only when the

172

See supra Part I.B.
A traditional justification for acquiring biometric data on arrestees was to enforce
laws seeking to prevent escape. Kaye, supra note 39, at 486. Additional uses for biometric
data on arrestees can be found in Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at
1127, 1129.
174
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
175
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
176
Id. at 80, 83.
177
See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1125.
173
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government has no special interests that merit consideration.178 Yet, the
primary purpose restriction on special needs balancing prevents the Court
from upholding Program 2 (when evidence production is the primary
purpose) but allows it to uphold Program 1 (because the added benefit to
law enforcement was not the primary purpose of the legislature in adopting
the program).
All the Justices in King, however, took the “primary purpose”
limitation on special needs balancing as sacrosanct and applicable to
multipurpose programs. The majority wrote that “[t]he special needs cases,
though in full accord with the result reached here, do not have a direct
bearing on the issues presented in this case . . . .”179 These Justices felt free
to balance to determine whether the Maryland law was reasonable because
cases within the special needs rubric had engaged in such balancing, as had
a few (most notably Samson) that did not qualify as special needs cases.
The dissent found the reference to the special needs cases “perplexing,” if
not disingenuous.180 This opinion relentlessly hammered away at the fact
that the primary purpose of the Maryland statute was to generate evidence
with which to apprehend and convict more criminals.
The King Court’s direct balancing sidesteps the primary purpose
limitation on creating a new exception to accommodate special interests.
But the resulting system, in which the Court takes pains to assure itself of a
primary purpose, and then dispenses with the need for such a finding when
it does not find one, is complicated and obscure. The Court could have
simply narrowed the primary purpose limitation for special needs balancing
to a sole purpose limitation.181 DNA-BC serves multiple purposes, and
dropping the assumed primary purpose limitation on balancing in
multipurpose search programs therefore would have enabled the Court to
balance to determine whether DNA-BC belongs in the category of
warrantless searches made permissible by special interests.
To be sure, even this simplified structure would be far from perfect.
What kind of a “rule” has more than twenty not-always-well-defined
exceptions?182 My claim, however, is not that today’s PSUWE rule is
178

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 352 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1111–13.
179
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013).
180
Id. at 1982 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181
See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
182
The rule against hearsay comes to mind. It even includes a perplexing residual
exception, just in case none of the more specific exceptions applies to highly reliable
hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 807. Is it surprising that calls for hearsay reform have been legion?
For examples of such reform proposals, see generally Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51 (1987); Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional
Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76
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trouble-free, but only that the King Court would have done better to treat
DNA-BC as a multipurpose program eligible for special needs balancing
rather than presenting it as a cousin of the special needs cases residing
outside the realm of special needs balancing. Along with that shift in
perspective, the majority could have undertaken a less contrived balancing
to ascertain whether DNA-BC programs—as one facet of a multimodal,
multipurpose biometric identification system for custodial arrestees—
should emerge as a new exception. Given the majority’s understanding of
the value of DNA-BC in solving and deterring crime, the special interests it
advances in the case of individuals who are under custodial arrest, and its
limited intrusiveness as compared to traditional, full-blown searches of
persons, houses, papers, and effects, the majority could have more
convincingly crafted a new special needs exception rather than creating the
same narrow exception implicitly via direct balancing.183
C. A BROADER BIOMETRIC EXCEPTION

The Court also might have left the broad contours of the PSUWE
framework unchanged by creating a broader categorical exception for the
acquisition and use of certain biometric data for authentication- and
association-identification.184
The established exceptions to per se
MINN. L. REV. 623 (1992); J.R. Spencer, Hearsay Reform: The Train Hits the Buffers at
Strasbourg, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 258 (2009). But the existence of a large number of
exceptions poses no great problem for hearsay, for most are obviously inapplicable in a
particular case. Only those exceptions whose contents are difficult to discern render a rule
hard to administer. Similarly, once an exception for a special needs program is recognized,
it can be applied easily if its boundaries are reasonably clear. Thus, the presence of more
than twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement is not itself a strong reason to condemn
the extended per se framework. Problems arise, however, from the vagueness in the
standards for recognizing new exceptions and from the indeterminacy or overbreadth in the
boundaries of the existing ones. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459, 460 n.4
(1981) (responding to “[t]he difficulty courts have had” defining “the proper scope of a
search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants”
by adopting an overbroad rule allowing full searches of the passenger compartment,
including “closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located
anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and
the like”), limited by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
183
Just how narrow the King exception is can be disputed. That is the subject of Part III
infra.
184
See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1139 (defending the view
that “[i]t should be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to acquire, analyze, store, and
trawl biometric data without a warrant and without individualized suspicion when five
conditions hold: (1) the person legitimately is detained (or the data are acquired without
confining the individual); (2) the process of collecting the data is not physically or mentally
invasive; (3) collection proceeds according to rules that prevent arbitrary selection of
individuals; (4) the biometric data are used only to establish or authenticate the true identity
of a given individual or to link individuals to crime scenes; and (5) the authentication or
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unreasonableness for searches for criminal evidence or contraband are
based on pragmatic considerations about the practicality of, and need for, a
magistrate’s review as well as the nature of the infringement on individual
interests, such as freedom of movement and the security of one’s person
and possessions. As with detaining a resident during a search with a
warrant185 or briefly stopping, questioning, and patting down an individual
who might be armed and about to commit a robbery,186 the acquisition of
biometric data is a lesser intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests than are
custodial arrests or ordinary searches of personal property and dwellings.
Therefore, the general judgment that a traditional search or seizure is per se
unreasonable in the absence of probable cause or a warrant does not
necessarily apply.187
Justice William Brennan stated some of the case for the biometric
exception when he wrote for the Court in Davis v. Mississippi188 that one
biometric modality, fingerprinting, “involves none of the probing into an
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search. . . . Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and
effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or
confessions . . . .”189 Retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in
an address delivered on the heels of the King decision, expressed his
agreement with the result in King, in part on the theory that inasmuch as
“taking a DNA sample reveals no information about the private, noncriminal conduct of the object of the search, . . . taking a DNA sample—or
a fingerprint sample—involves a far lesser intrusion on an ordinary
person’s privacy than a search that allows an officer to rummage through
private papers.”190 Although the notion of “no information” whatsoever is
overstated,191 trawling crime scene databases for fingerprints or DNA
matches has a lesser impact on bona fide Fourth Amendment interests than

intelligence-gathering system is valid, reliable, and effective”); see also D.H. Kaye, Who
Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other Biometric Data
from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188, 193–94 (2006).
185
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–05 (1981).
186
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968).
187
See Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 139, at 1098;
Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 128–29.
188
394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
189
Id. at 727.
190
Justice John Paul Stevens (ret.), Address at American Constitution Society
Convention at 15 (June 14, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/saIN9F.
191
See David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: The Tenth Justice (Stevens) Votes, FORENSIC
SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (June 15, 2013), http://goo.gl/lXaCFo.
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traditional searches.192 Consequently, the case for an exception to the per se
rule is substantial.
Although Maryland mentioned this possibility in its petition for
review,193 neither side referred to it again, and the Court did not consider it.
This was unfortunate. An exception within the PSUWE framework would
have a supplied a sturdier basis for upholding DNA-BC—or alternatively,
for explaining why DNA collection and analysis does not qualify for the
exception when fingerprinting, photographing, and noting distinguishing
features like tattoos do qualify (or are of so little concern to the security of
the person and his property as to escape the attention of the Fourth
Amendment entirely).
The Kennedy majority saw no convincing reason to distinguish
between DNA on the one hand and the older modalities on the other. In
response, Justice Scalia’s dissent sought to distinguish the latter three
practices from collecting a person’s DNA on the grounds that they either
are not considered searches or that they are not systematically used to
associate an arrested individual with a different (past or future) crime.194
These distinctions, however, are overdrawn. First, the search/no-search
dichotomy in Fourth Amendment law does not differentiate DNA typing
from fingerprinting. That is, the threshold question of whether something is
a search should not be answered one way when police force an individual to
undergo fingerprinting for inclusion in a database and a totally different
way when they compel the person to submit a DNA sample for a database
profile.195 Both actions should be considered searches. Furthermore, the
search/no-search classification is binary. Two information-gathering
practices can be nearly the same in their impact on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests yet wind up on different sides of the dotted line.
Merely asserting that one activity is a “search” and another might not be
does not establish that they are dramatically different.196
Second, the dissent’s claim that fingerprint databases are not
systematically used to catch criminals does not reflect current reality.
Justice Scalia’s evidence to the contrary is based on an obvious misreading
192

See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1133–39; David H. Kaye,
DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 41, 46–49 (2011) [hereinafter Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a
Search].
193
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207, cert granted, 133 S. Ct.
1958 (2013).
194
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1986–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195
Justice Scalia’s approach to defining searches admits of no such distinction. See
David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: The Dissent’s Ten Second Rule, FORENSIC SCI.
STATISTICS & LAW (Nov. 29, 2013), http://goo.gl/9MhQOk.
196
See id.
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of an FBI publication.197 Latent-print analysts routinely trawl databases
populated with arrestee prints for “cold hits.”198 These cases received more
publicity when they were novel, but they continue to be reported,199 and the
FBI searches new arrestee “prints coming in every day” for leads in
unsolved cases.200
It is true that the original or primary motivation for amassing large
arrestee fingerprint databases was not to trawl them for matches to latent
prints from crime scenes. It was to ascertain whether an arrestee’s prints
already were in the database as a result of a previous arrest. To that extent,
arrestee DNA profiling differs from arrestee fingerprinting. DNA profiling
always had criminal intelligence gathering as its primary purpose.
Although that also is a major purpose of arrestee fingerprinting today, it
was not always so.
This history may be significant in deciding whether to balance under
the special needs line of cases, but it is not germane to deciding whether to
consider a categorical exception for collecting biometric data for that very
purpose. The rationale for the general biometric-data exception is that
association-identification is an important function that can be performed
without impermissibly infringing on interests that the Fourth Amendment
protects. To say that some biometric identifiers (such as photographs) can
be acquired without “searching” and that others (such as fingerprints) can
be acquired for authentication-identification (and then used for the
197

Id.; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IAFIS)/NEXT GENERATION
IDENTIFICATION (NGI) REPOSITORY FOR INDIVIDUALS OF SPECIAL CONCERN (RISC),
http://goo.gl/Oj0YNs (last visited May 28, 2014).
198
ILL. STATE POLICE, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (Oct. 2003),
http://goo.gl/ZSCp4r (reporting 21,407 trawls and 6,065 hits from 1989 through 2003); IND.
STATE LAB. DIV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2013), http://goo.gl/N18NIE (reporting “183
AFIS hits in 2013 even though the system was down for several months due to being
updated”); WASH. STATE PATROL, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (Apr.
2012), http://goo.gl/8ZlDcP (reporting that “more than 600 identifications have been made in
Washington State”); see also Kaye, supra note 195; Kaye, supra note 48, at 44 n.38
(collecting statistics indicating that thousands of fingerprint database trawls occur annually
in active and cold cases combined); E-mail from Stephen G. Fisher, Jr., FBI Criminal Justice
Info. Services, to author (Apr. 15, 2014) (on file with author) (reporting that “[d]uring Fiscal
Year 2013, the IAFIS [Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System] received
nearly 220,000 latent searches from the latent user community”).
199
See, e.g., Brian R. Ballou, Fingerprint Technology Credited for Cold Case Arrest,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2011, at B12; Summer Moore, Family Says Prints Led to Man’s
Arrest, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 5, 2012, at 1A; Dean A. Radflord, Arrest Made in ’78 Cold
Case, RENTON REPORTER, Sept. 23, 2011, at 3; Kevin Valine, Fingerprints Lead to Arrest in
Robbery, FORENSIC MAG. (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://goo.gl/64krsd.
200 Adam Vrankulj, NGI: A Closer Look at the FBI’s Billion-Dollar Biometric Program,
BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Nov. 4, 2013), http://goo.gl/7v7IsF.
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secondary purpose of association-identification) says next to nothing about
whether a proposed exception to the requirement for a warrant and probable
cause for collecting and using certain biometric-identifiers should include
DNA profiles.
That judgment depends on whether the state’s interests in having these
identifiers—for criminal intelligence as well as authentication—outweigh
the Fourth Amendment interests of individuals. Whether the criminal
intelligence function is called primary or secondary, it is equally important
and legitimate. Therefore, the dissent’s effort to distinguish DNA from
other biometric identifiers, even if it were more accurate, would fall short of
what would be needed to defeat the argument for a categorical exception.
To justify denying the exception to CODIS profiles, one would have to
demonstrate that DNA sampling, as regulated by the statute, is substantially
more invasive of legitimate individual interests than is collecting the other
types of biometric data.201 As indicated in Part III, arguments to this effect
can be made, but the dissent did not even try.202
III. MORE TO COME
To this point, I have probed the place of King in the convoluted
analytical framework for determining the reasonableness of searches and
seizures. I have argued that King neither dismantles this framework nor
radically changes it. Furthermore, I have suggested that the majority
opinion would have been more convincing had it candidly endorsed the
value of arrestee databases in solving crimes for their own sake rather than
as a mere device to assist in pretrial decisionmaking, and I elucidated two
possible doctrinal paths to this more comprehensive balancing.203
Having elucidated the logic of King, I turn now to the implications that
this logic (and the alternatives that I have sketched) holds for DNA-BC as

201

Any suggestion that association-identification is necessarily more invasive of
legitimate individual interests than is authentication-identification would be untenable. As
much as an individual might want to cloak his presence at a crime scene as a “private fact,”
see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 512–
15 (2007), the interest in not being caught carries no weight, see Kaye, A Fourth Amendment
Theory, supra note 123; Kerr, supra, at 511 (discussing cases dismissing “the mere
expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
202
See David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: When Being Smart and Witty Isn’t Enough,
FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Nov. 27, 2013), http://goo.gl/QQmisR.
203
As shown in Part II, the Court could have included the normal evidence-producing
value in the balancing by clarifying or eliminating the overbroad primary purpose limitation
on the special needs exception to the rule of per se unreasonableness. Alternatively, the
value could have been considered at an earlier stage, by examining whether there should be a
new categorical exception for purely biometric data that includes DNA profiles.
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practiced in other jurisdictions and as it might be implemented in the future.
The facts in King make for a narrow holding. The DNA sampling was
confined to violent crimes and burglaries; officials had no discretion to pick
and choose which arrestees’ DNA to acquire; a physical intrusion into the
body took place; the loci tested revealed no sensitive medical or other
privacy-laden information; the state trawled the forensic index (of unsolved
crime scene profiles) only for matches to the arrestee (and not for partial
matches that might point primarily to immediate relatives); the profiling
and uploading occurred after formal charges; and the samples are destroyed
if a conviction does not ensue. But which of these factors are actually
critical to the Court’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment allows DNABC?
A. NONCODING LOCI AND STATUTORY PRIVACY PROTECTIONS

The King Court referred to “scientific and statutory safeguards” that
ensured that there was no “significant invasion of privacy that would render
the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.”204
“Safeguards” is an appropriate term—in the long-term, neither science nor
law can afford absolute protection against the discovery of information in
which an individual has a reasonable claim of secrecy. They can, however,
go a long way toward that goal.
On the scientific side, ever since “DNA fingerprinting” burst onto the
forensic scene in the mid-1980s,205 government authorities and scientists
have assured us that the DNA variations (alleles) at the locations (loci) used
to create identifying profiles for the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS) are pure junk206—they do not encode proteins,207 they have no
204

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 262 (2010).
206
See, e.g., Kirk E. Lohmueller, Letter to the Editor, Graydon et al. Provide No New
Evidence that Forensic STR Loci Are Functional, 4 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 273, 273
(2010); N.Y. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES 2012, at 5,
http://goo.gl/8xhRzT (last visited May 29, 2014) (“The pieces of DNA that are analyzed for
the databank were specifically chosen because they are ‘junk DNA.’”); WASH. STATE
PATROL CODIS LAB., THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (Jan. 2012), http://goo.gl/HavkZi
(“The regions of DNA tested are non-coding and are often referred to as ‘junk DNA’
because they don’t code for anything in particular and don’t yield medical information.”).
207
See, e.g., H. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG
ELIMINATION ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(1), at 27 (“[T]he genetic markers used for
forensic DNA testing . . . show only the configuration of DNA at selected ‘junk sites’ which
do not control or influence the expression of any trait.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT: THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM, at 51 (Sept.
2001), available at http://goo.gl/RZrqN1 (“These areas are considered junk DNA because
they do not ‘code’ for anything (i.e., the DNA does not translate into a personal identifying
characteristic like ‘blue eyes’ or into a genetic predisposition for disease).”).
205
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known associations with diseases or behavioral traits,208 and they contain no
information beyond an arbitrary identifier.209 The Court espoused this view
when it wrote that “[t]he CODIS loci are from the non-protein coding junk
regions of DNA, and ‘are not known to have any association with a genetic
disease or any other genetic predisposition. Thus, the information in the
database is only useful for human identity testing.’”210
This reasoning is oversimplified. That STRs do not encode proteins
does not necessarily mean that they cannot possibly affect the quantity or
timing of gene expression or that they are entirely uncorrelated with DNA
sequences that are expressed. Moreover, CODIS loci certainly can be used
to make inferences about a few family relationships and to give rough
indications of biogeographic ancestry.211 Nevertheless, even though the
majority’s brief description omits such nuances, the factual premise that the
particular sequences used in CODIS databases neither cause nor are
strongly predictive of any medical conditions or other traits is warranted.212
The current loci seem to be devoid of significant information on health
status. As a result, the “scientific safeguard” of choosing only such
vacuous loci for human identity testing is effective, at least for now.
But what if future research falsified this premise by finding some
variations at one or more CODIS loci to be predictive of some trait
possessed by some individuals whose profiles reside in a database?213
According to the King Court, “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to
208
H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(1), at 27 (“DNA profiles generated in conformity with the
national standards do not reveal information relating to any medical condition or other
trait.”); DNA—Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal
Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,933 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 28) (DNA
profiles “do not disclose an individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions”).
209
H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(1), at 27 (“By design, the effect of the system is to provide a
kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a
basis for determining or inferring anything else about the person.”); DNA—Sample
Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,933 (“DNA profiles that are entered into CODIS . . . amount
to ‘genetic fingerprints’ that can be used to identify an individual uniquely . . . .”).
210
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013).
211
See Brief of Genetics, Genomics and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae
in Support of Neither Party, at 2–3, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207). Furthermore, using
the phrase “junk regions” invites confusion with the venerable but subtle theory that the
specific base-pair sequences in many stretches of DNA have no effect on individuals’
reproductive fitness even if the “junk regions” have some evolutionary importance. See id.
at 25; see also David Kaye, “Open to Dispute”: CODIS STR Loci as Private Medical
Information, FORENSIC MAG. (May 28, 2014, 8:27 AM), http://goo.gl/BasjLY.
212
See Brief of Genetics, supra note 211, at 37.
213
CODIS profiles can be used to detect trisomies (an extra chromosome), but these
conditions are either fatal or grossly apparent. See id. at 15 n.10; D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s
Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 70, 77 n.34 (2007).
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determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease
or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case would present
additional privacy concerns not present here.”214 In contemplating such
trait-identification, it should be clear that the magnitude of those concerns
would depend on the trait. For example, if individuals with one allele had
predictably larger hands or longer eyebrows than those with other alleles,
there would no cause for concern.215 These are not especially private traits.
Less visible traits—say, slight differences in the size of the vermiform
appendix—also may be inconsequential; hence, using coding loci that
convey information about traits like these would not be objectionable.
Furthermore, even loci that are clinically relevant might not create a
meaningful threat to privacy. Suppose, for example, that a locus affected
the metabolism of drugs used to treat a rare neurological disorder—
individuals with one allele would be good candidates for one drug therapy,
but other patients would do better with a second drug.216 It is not obvious
how including this locus in a database profile would present a meaningful
privacy concern. Police could not use the clinically relevant aspect of the
DNA sequence to hurt or help anyone in the database. Consequently,
“hereditary factors” that go beyond identification might present no
meaningful privacy concerns, and the “additional privacy concerns” would
be a feather on the balance.
But many inherited traits are far more problematic. Suppose that a
CODIS locus unexpectedly turns out to reveal highly sensitive medical
information—for example, that an individual is almost surely a carrier of a
life-threatening, recessive, hereditary disease such as Meckel-Gruber
syndrome or is at an elevated risk for a particular mental illness. The
simplest way to restore the previous level of scientific safeguards would be
to retire this locus from the CODIS system. 217 Moreover, even under this
214

King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
Yet, a brief written by Brandon Garrett and Erin Murphy and signed by twelve other
law professors presented DNA tests for “sex, relatedness, eye color, hair color, and
continental ancestry” as well as “freckles, moles, curly hair, skin color, earlobe shape, [and]
body height.” Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 39, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207). These tests were supposedly good
examples of the “intrusive nature” of DNA technology, id. at 36, and the disturbing “secrets
that a DNA sample can unlock” id. at 38. Most of these “secrets” do not seem either
“secret” or “intrusive.” As Judge Carlos Lucero observed, even if DNA database samples
were mined for clues as to visible traits, the information could not be considered deeply
private. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1230 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J.,
concurring), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761, 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
216
Less hypothetically, one’s ABO blood group is vital information for blood
transfusions, but it does not raise a grave privacy concern.
217
Dropping a locus would reduce the statistical power of a database match, but with the
impending expanded set of CODIS loci, see Douglas R. Hares, Letter to the Editor,
215
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worst-case scenario, the constitutional calculus might not change—if there
are sufficient “statutory protections.”218 In this regard, the Court quoted
language in Whalen v. Roe219 about the salutary effect of “a statutory or
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.”220 Because of such
protections and a history devoid of privacy breaches, the Whalen Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to a New York database of everyone’s
prescriptions for controlled substances. If a state can be trusted to
safeguard a database that records who is actually taking psychotropic
medications, how can it not be trusted to safeguard a database that merely
hints at who might need these medications?
At present, the statutory protections against unauthorized disclosure
(to insurers, employers, or anyone else) help assure that the DNA sample
from which the medically uninformative identification profile is obtained is
not used to infringe legitimate individual interests.221 If this assurance is
sufficient for that purpose—if, as a multitude of courts have held, we can
trust the government not to genotype samples for health-related loci or to
release these samples to insurers or employers222—then it is not obvious
why the Court should not also trust the government to avoid disclosing the
alleles that comprise the identification profile. In any event, if biomedical
research changes the usable information content of DNA profiles, it will be
necessary to rebalance the possible invasion of individual interests in
medical privacy against the value of the database to the government. In
doing so, the Court should attend to the nature and social significance of the
new information in the profiles as well as the efficacy of the statutory
safeguards. And in rebalancing, it would be fallacious to assume that all
relationships between a locus and a phenotype automatically render the

Expanding the CODIS Core Loci in the United States, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS e52
(2012), there is more than enough power to discriminate among individuals, at least “for
single-source profile comparisons and international data sharing,” Jianye Ge et al.,
Developing Criteria and Data to Determine Best Options for Expanding the Core CODIS
Loci, 3 INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 1, 1 (2012). Even so, altering the CODIS loci is not a step
to be taken lightly.
218
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
219
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
220
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
221
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(b), 2-506 (LexisNexis 2011); D.H.
Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databanks, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 259, 276–84 (2006).
222
A lack of adequate safeguards would undermine the many cases upholding DNA
sampling after conviction.

2014]

WHY SO CONTRIVED?

577

system unreasonable.223 Much depends on the predictive value of the locus
and the particular phenotype.
B. FROM “SERIOUS OFFENSES” TO UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

1. The Seriousness of an Offense
California’s popularly enacted Proposition 69 extends DNA-BC to “all
felonies, including simple drug possession, joyriding, unlawfully subleasing
a car, or taking $250 worth of nuts from an orchard”224—a point that the
American Civil Liberties Union is pressing in a case reargued twice en
banc, then remanded, in the Ninth Circuit.225 The federal DNA database
law is even more capacious. It covers all offenses for which a custodial
arrest is made, no matter how trivial the transgression. Parking illegally on
federal land or water skiing in a prohibited area is enough to permit an
arrest.226 How vulnerable are these laws to Fourth Amendment challenge?
The King majority cautioned that “the necessary predicate of a valid
arrest for a serious offense is fundamental,”227 but the dissenters could not
“imagine what principle could possibly justify this limitation . . . .”228 In
the dissenters’ view:
If one believes that DNA will “identify” someone arrested for assault, he must believe
that it will “identify” someone arrested for a traffic offense. This Court does not base
its judgments on senseless distinctions. At the end of the day, logic will out. When
there comes before us the taking of DNA from an arrestee for a traffic violation, the
Court will predictably (and quite rightly) say, “We can find no significant difference
between this case and King.” Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable
consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national
DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever
reason.229

A balancing test, however, leaves room for different outcomes.
Although “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most

223
Cf. generally David H. Kaye, Commentary, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks
for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179 (2001) (arguing against a rule that would
forbid the use of any and all coding loci).
224
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Supplemental Brief Re: Maryland v. King at 3, Haskell v.
Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-15152) (citation omitted).
225
See Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also People v.
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011),
vacated, 302 P.3d 1051 (Cal. 2013) (ordering reconsideration in light of Maryland v. King).
226
See United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
227
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013).
228
Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229
Id.
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devious and dangerous criminals,”230 on average, people arrested for minor
traffic offenses are less likely to be hiding their true identities and to have
incriminating DNA samples at crime scenes than are people arrested for far
more serious matters.231 Under free-form balancing, this is a logically
relevant consideration.232 Whether this difference is significant enough to
change the outcome is debatable of course,233 but the outcome is not
“entirely predictable.”234
230

Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012).
Cf. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (“Pretrial release of a person charged with a dangerous
crime is a most serious responsibility.” (emphasis added)).
232
In Haskell v. Harris, the United States seemed to argue to the contrary:
231

If the term “serious offense” did carry any meaning in King, . . . [it] includes any crime for which
an individual is arrested and booked in police custody. This meaning is logical, not only because
the Court analyzed DNA fingerprinting as a “booking procedure,” but also because it analogized
DNA fingerprinting to traditional “fingerprinting and photographing.”

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 7–8,
Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-15152) (citations omitted). This
“logic,” however, is specious. That DNA sampling is a permissible part of the bookkeeping
process for an individual placed in custody for offense A does not imply that it also is
permissible for offense B unless B = A in all relevant respects. There is no a priori logical
reason to assume that all offenses are so fungible. Similarly, even though DNA is like
friction-ridge skin because both can be used to differentiate among individuals, it does not
necessarily follow that the two identifiers are equivalent in other respects. The real issue
under King is whether the government’s interests in acquiring DNA profiles are so reduced
with respect to lesser offenses that the government’s demand for the DNA is unreasonable.
This is a question of practical reason, not of deductive logic or word games. See David H.
Kaye, Get Serious: The US Department of Justice’s Amicus Brief in Haskell v. Harris,
FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Dec. 6, 2013), http://goo.gl/7T2ZbU.
233
Commentators who are critical of King tend to read the case broadly. For example,
Professor Murphy concludes that the Kennedy majority did not even “attempt[] to limit its
holding” to serious crimes. See Murphy, supra note 66, at 171. Professor Elizabeth Joh
thinks that “King does little to limit states from expanding the scope of their arrestee profiles
to all arrestees, regardless of the severity of the offense.” Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v.
King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 281, 289 (2013). Judge Milan
Smith, who wrote the panel opinion upholding California’s law before Maryland v. King,
likewise concluded after King that DNA collection “is clearly constitutional as applied to
anyone arrested for, or charged with, a felony offense by California state or local officials.”
Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The remainder of the en banc court did not express an
opinion on whether King’s approval of DNA-BC reaches beyond the specific felony offenses
that trigger DNA collection in Maryland. See David H. Kaye, The Ninth Circuit’s Minimal
Opinion in Haskell v. Harris, FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Mar. 22, 2014),
http://goo.gl/Zo39NL (discussing the logic of the per curiam opinion).
234
The right to trial by jury depends on the seriousness of the offense. See, e.g., Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (crime punishable by six months’ imprisonment
triggered the right). It does not follow, however, that the requirement of a serious charge has
the same content in other contexts. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (for
the right to appointed counsel, “actual imprisonment [is] the line”).
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2. The Necessity of an Arrest Founded on Probable Cause
If the dissenting Justices were correct in lamenting that “your DNA
can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever
arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason,”235 and if a
“wrongful” arrest means one without probable cause, then everyone could
be rounded up (arrested on no basis whatsoever) and typed. If such a case
ever arose, and the dissenters did not have the votes to overrule King, they
certainly would argue that King simply does not apply. And they would be
correct. It would be perverse for any Justice to maintain that the
government must be free to retain wrongfully acquired samples and profiles
just because King holds that it is permissible to acquire these items from
properly arrested individuals. Justice Kennedy’s opinion plainly rests on
the legitimacy of the arrest that prompted the DNA collection.236
Suppose, however, that an encounter that prompts DNA sampling did
not reach the point of a custodial arrest. Briefly stopping a person on foot
or in a vehicle to investigate suspicious activity is a seizure, but it does not
require probable cause or a warrant.237 It has been said that King “invites
(and nearly decides)”238 that DNA collection and on-the-spot profiling
would be permissible to establish the true identity of the suspect and,
presumably, to quickly trawl the DNA database of unsolved crimes (called
a “forensic index”239). However, this expansive reading of the majority
opinion ignores the majority’s major justification for balancing—the lack of
individual discretion in electing to take DNA from a custodial arrestee240—
and it presumes that the Court would see the balance as unchanged, even
though (1) the government interests would be different241 and (2) the
235

King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (majority opinion) (stating that “once respondent’s DNA was
lawfully collected the STR analysis of respondent’s DNA pursuant to CODIS procedures did
not amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the DNA identification
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)).
237
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 30 (1968) (allowing the stopping and frisking of
individuals on the street); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)
(analogizing “the usual traffic stop” to a Terry stop rather than to custodial arrest that would
trigger the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
238
Joh, supra note 233, at 291.
239
David H. Kaye, The Dictionary and the Database, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 389, 391
(2013).
240
See infra text accompanying note 265.
241
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (“Second, law enforcement officers bear a responsibility for
ensuring that the custody of an arrestee does not create inordinate risks for facility staff, for
the existing detainee population, and for a new detainee.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); id. at 1973 (“Fourth, an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to an
assessment of the danger he poses to the public, and this will inform a court’s determination
whether the individual should be released on bail.”).
236
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individual would have enhanced “expectations of privacy”242 outside of jail.
Nevertheless, under the broader biometric-data exception, the Court could
reach this result, at least for a conceivable technology that would generate
DNA profiles, in a matter of minutes. Some police departments use mobile
fingerprint scanners to “help us ID folks who try to be misleading.” 243
Presumably, this demand for a suspect to cooperate in identifying himself
via mobile fingerprint scanning is constitutional.244 If a mobile DNA
scanner could perform the same function245 with no greater risk of sensitive
trait-identification,246 why should its use be treated any differently?
3. Programs for DNA Sampling Without Arrests or Stops
Even if King does not invite the police to acquire samples wrongfully
(and risk exclusion of the resulting evidence),247 what about a system that
acquired DNA from everyone without trampling on their Fourth
Amendment right to freedom from arbitrary arrests? What if the state made
DNA donation at the time of taking a driving test a condition for issuing a
driver’s license? What if neonatal screening tests for genetic conditions
now performed as a public health measure (and thus permissible under a
special needs analysis) were expanded to include STR profiling, with the
identification profiles uploaded to law enforcement databases? Police never
would touch these samples (or the babies), but they could upload the
profiles into databases encompassing entire local, state, or national
populations.248 Universality would remove the disparate impact by race and

242
Id. at 1979 (quoted in full infra text accompanying note 258). However, the
diminished expectations of privacy incident to extended detention flow from the fact that
government has chosen to jail the suspect. They should not be seen as an independent
government interest. See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 124, at 1133.
243
Bianca Cain Johnson, Fingerprint Scanner Paying Off for Richmond County Police,
AUGUSTA CHRON. (June 17, 2013, 5:28 AM), http://goo.gl/eLvnvs.
244
Cf. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186–87 (2004) (upholding
punishment for failing to provide a name as required by a “stop and identify” statute).
245
Such nearly instantaneous DNA scanners are still science fiction. The fastest system
for forensic STR profiling requires about ninety minutes to generate a profile. See John W.
Blackledge et al., Rapid DNA, 14 NAT’L ACAD. ASSOC. 14, 16 (May/June 2012), available at
http://goo.gl/3mrJFd; Press Release, IntegenX® Announces First State-Wide Deployment of
the RapidHIT® System with SmallPond™ at Arizona Department of Public Safety (May 13,
2014), available at http://goo.gl/hj7Egz (“less than two hours”).
246
On the limited value of CODIS loci for trait-identification, see infra Part III.A.
Retaining the DNA sample would pose a possible threat to informational privacy, but such
retention is no more necessary than is retaining a driver’s license produced in response to a
police demand for identification.
247
See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
248
See David H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 438; David
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class that infuses a system in which acquisition of samples turns on contact
with the police.249 It would intensify the level of public concern for and
scrutiny of any abuses in the databases’ operation.250 It would enable police
to start with a more complete list of individuals with matching DNA,
avoiding the tunnel vision that can follow from too narrow a pool of initial
suspects.251
It would render lingering arguments about population
frequencies for DNA profiles and database search statistics252 essentially
irrelevant. It would largely obviate any need for local “DNA dragnets,”253
“familial searches,”254 and small DNA databases operating independently of
the statutorily specified state and national systems.255 It would be helpful in
H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5–9, 19
(2001).
249
The FBI reports that the distribution of arrests by race was 69.2% white, 28.4% black,
1.5% Native American, and 0.9% Asian or Pacific Islander.
FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2011, at tbl.43A, http://goo.gl/g9UYgb. Blacks compose about 13.6% of the U.S.
population.
THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2011),
http://goo.gl/xZvRxI. Thus, an African-American faced about twice the risk of being
arrested as would be predicted for a system in which arrests and race were entirely
uncorrelated. This disparity is less pronounced, however, than that for blacks sentenced to
prison. Almost 38% of all convicted prisoners were black—a considerably higher
proportion than that for arrestees, according to the figures in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 7 tbl.7 (2012).
250
See Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth
Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 274 (2007).
251
See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision
in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (“A theme running through almost every
[exoneration] . . . is the problem of tunnel vision . . . that lead[s] actors in the criminal justice
system to focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will build a case for
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
252
See, e.g., People v. Koua Xiong, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 886–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013);
Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254, 275–78 (Md. 2013); David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases
for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid Of?, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 153
(2009).
253
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 443–45 (2001).
254
Compare Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291 (2010) (arguing that trawling DNA databases to locate a relative who
might be the source of crime-scene DNA that partially matches a DNA profile in the
database is unconstitutional and problematic), with Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The
Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248 (2006)
(discerning fewer fundamental problems with such near-miss searching), and David H.
Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching,” 51
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2013) (arguing that the practice, if implemented carefully, is
constitutional).
255
See Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2013, at A1. To the extent that the national system lags behind state-of-the-art
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cases of identifying bodies (or body parts) that might be from missing
persons in isolated cases or in mass disasters. Although it may be a
nonstarter politically, the case for a population-wide database is not
frivolous.256
At this point, however, the Justices have stayed as far away as possible
from suggesting or endorsing any such possibility. At oral argument
several Justices questioned counsel for Maryland intently on how a ruling
could be confined to lawbreakers, and the state and federal government
tried to assure the Justices that they need not adopt reasoning that would
imply that a population-wide database would pass constitutional muster.257
The majority then took pains to confine its reasoning to arrestees. Justice
Kennedy wrote:
[T]he search here at issue differs from the sort of programmatic searches of either the
public at large or a particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens that
the Court has previously labeled as “‘special needs’” searches. When the police stop
a motorist at a checkpoint or test a political candidate for illegal narcotics, they
intrude upon substantial expectations of privacy. So the Court has insisted on some
purpose other than “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” to justify
these searches in the absence of individualized suspicion. Once an individual has
been arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense that may require detention
before trial, however, his or her expectations of privacy and freedom from police
scrutiny are reduced. DNA identification like that at issue here thus does not require
consideration of any unique needs that would be required to justify searching the
average citizen. The special needs cases, though in full accord with the result reached
here, do not have a direct bearing on the issues presented in this case, because unlike
the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a detainee has a
reduced expectation of privacy.258

The Court’s claim that the primary purpose limitation on the special
needs exception does not apply because arrestees have “a reduced

techniques for coping with mixed crime scene samples and kinship searches or has slow
response times, however, local databases might remain attractive. See, e.g., Ben Finley,
Bensalem Police Try Rapid DNA Testing, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 20, 2013, at B3.; Press
Release, SmallPond Announces LODIS Migration Program (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://goo.gl/nEp19F; Press Release, supra note 245.
256
Akhil Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at
A31; Kaye & Smith, supra note 248, at 439–40; Kaye et al., supra note 248, at 6; Richard
Lempert, Maryland v. King: An Unfortunate Supreme Court Decision on the Collection of
DNA Samples, BROOKINGS INST. (June 6, 2013, 11:38 AM), available at
http://goo.gl/xAT64S; Michael Seringhaus, Op-Ed, To Stop Crime, Share Your Genes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A23.
257
See David H. Kaye, The Oral Argument in Maryland v. King—Part I, FORENSIC SCI.
STATISTICS & LAW (Mar. 2, 2013), http://goo.gl/yHPeL4.
258
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013) (internal citations omitted).

2014]

WHY SO CONTRIVED?

583

expectation of privacy” is vacuous.259 To be sure, arrestees may be
searched in ways inapplicable (thankfully) to people who are not in police
custody. For example, more thorough searches for weapons or evidence
can be conducted at detention facilities.260 But the existence of special
interests in jail security and the search incident to arrest exception to the per
se rule do not render the arrestee’s interests in being free from DNA
sampling and profiling any different from the same interests prior to arrest.
The argument that arrestees are in a unique category just because they have
been arrested is an empty tautology. The only relevant distinction between
arrestees and the rest of the population is that the state’s interests in
acquiring profiles and trawling for matches are greater in the case of
arrestees. The individual’s interests are no less.
Thus, the gravamen of the majority opinion is that an arrest itself
brings to bear a dominant set of state interests relating to pretrial
supervision. By definition, these interests are not applicable to individuals
who never have been arrested—even if these other individuals are equally
likely to be traceable through DNA from crime scenes. In addition,
arrestees may differ from the general population to the extent that arrestee
DNA is more likely to be productive in generating matches than is
nonarrestee DNA. To that extent, arrestee DNA is especially valuable for
the pretrial processing on which the King majority rested its hat, further
supporting the view that King’s reach extends no farther than to properly
arrested individuals.
This is so even though the dissent was correct to maintain that the
pretrial supervision rationale was practically fictitious as applied to the
particular facts and timing of the belated DNA trawling in King. The Court
could have written an opinion that approved of DNA-BC only in
jurisdictions that processed samples very quickly or only in those cases in
which the processing was speedy enough to maximize all the potential
benefits that the Court ascribed to a DNA-BC program. The majority
settled on a broader but more easily administered rule to make DNA-BC
practical in a world with variations in the effectiveness of these programs
across jurisdictional space and over time. Although this result seems to
give states that currently are taking months to process arrestee samples a
free ride, the majority maintained that even long delays in processing these
259
As explained supra Part II.C, this limitation on special needs balancing should not
apply for a different reason. The limitation should not apply because it is inconsistent with
the raison d’être of the special needs exception. The exception exists because the normal
calculus of state and individual interests that undergirds the per se unreasonable rule is
inapposite whenever the state has more than the normal interest in finding evidence of
criminality for the purpose of investigation or prosecution.
260
See generally, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
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samples did not make them useless.261 Thus, the Court’s rather generic
approval of DNA-BC is defensible on the ground that it would be difficult
to develop a workable basis for deciding just when a state is moving fast
enough in processing arrestee samples to achieve enough of the pretrial
benefits that the majority enumerated.
Moreover, although DNA
processing backlogs are a perennial problem, they do come and go.262 With
current technology, DNA testing can be a significant appurtenance to, if not
an equal partner of, fingerprinting for pretrial supervision.263 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion therefore empowers governments to adopt and
implement legislation that could bring about this result, even if this
outcome is not achieved immediately and in all cases.
To extend the result in King to a population-wide system, however, the
majority would have to move beyond its pretrial processing and supervision
theory. First, it would have to determine whether direct balancing should
be used when the state advances only interests in developing evidence for
use in criminal investigations, prosecutions, and some different ancillary
purposes, such as locating missing persons. Second, if the Court applied
direct balancing (or special needs balancing, or balancing to decide whether
DNA profiling belongs in a new categorical exception to the per se
unreasonable rule), it would have to decide whether these interests
outweigh those Fourth Amendment interests that would support an
individual’s asserted right to keep DNA to himself. Although a categorical
exception should apply to a carefully designed and administered system,
this conclusion is a judgment that depends on an assessment of facts about
the nature and implications of DNA profiling and identification. Pure
logic—at least, the logic of the King opinion—does not dictate that the
Court arrive at that endpoint.264 There is a reasonable argument for the
261
Justice Kennedy wrote that DNA-BC is still useful for pretrial decisions even when it
takes months to obtain results and even when an individual has been released pending trial.
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (discussing the long period of detention that can precede conditional
release of an arrestee and the possibility of revoking probation in light of a DNA match).
262
See, e.g., Associated Press, FBI Lab Reduces DNA Case Backlog 87 Percent,
FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 25, 2012 8:00 PM), http://goo.gl/OT9Wnn; Melinda DeSlatte, State
Police Crime Lab Wipes Out Case Backlog, FORENSIC MAG. (July 24, 2013, 11:19 AM),
http://goo.gl/qAOm9G; Jason Stein & Ryan Haggerty, Backlog of DNA Cases Eliminated,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 22, 2010, at B1; Juan A. Lozano, Houston Praised for
Handling of Rape Kit Backlog, NBCDFW.COM (Oct. 9, 2013, 7:08 AM),
http://goo.gl/pqhYV1.
263
See infra text accompanying note 293.
264
But see Lempert, supra note 256 (“King is precedent for establishing a national DNA
database since it is hard to imagine any principled distinction between King while he stands
unconvicted and ourselves. (The only salient difference, that an arrest requires probable
cause, is too thin a reed for any but the most cynical to rest upon.)”). Moreover, one explicit
rationale of King does support universality. Justice Kennedy wrote that “the identification of
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constitutionality of a population-wide database, but the King opinions do
not make that argument.
C. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION

A key factor in the majority’s approval of direct reasonableness
balancing was that “the search involves no discretion that could properly be
limited by the interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and
the law enforcement officer.”265 In other situations, such as roadblocks for
drunken driving, the uniformity or randomness of the impositions on
affected individuals has been important. If government officials were left to
pick and choose among arrestees, the necessary “family resemblance” for
engaging in direct balancing might be absent,266 and the DNA sampling
should be impermissible under the usual per se rule for warrantless
searches.
Although DNA database statutes require collection and profiling for
all individuals arrested for qualifying offenses, enormous discretion can be
exercised in deciding whether to make an arrest. As long as probable cause
exists, police are free to arrest anyone just to obtain a DNA profile. Such
pretextual arrests are permitted under Whren v. United States.267 In Whren,
plainclothes vice-squad officers in an unmarked car in a high-crime area
followed a truck with two young men in it that sped off after sitting idle at
an intersection for an unusually long time. They overtook the truck and
ordered the driver to pull over. Approaching the driver’s window, the vicesquad officer saw plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine.
Charged with violating various federal drug laws, the two men argued that
the police lacked even reasonable suspicion to think that they were engaged
in illegal drug dealing activity and that the officer’s “asserted ground for
approaching the vehicle—to give the driver a warning concerning traffic
violations—was pretextual.”268
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court unanimously rejected “any
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on
an arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous crime” could “prevent the grotesque detention
of . . . innocent people.” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). One can say the same thing about identifying a nonarrestee as the perpetrator of a
crime.
265
Id. at 1969 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
266
I say “might be” because the Court did not question the status of Samson and Knights
as direct balancing cases, even though police were free to decide whether or not to search the
probationer or parolee. Evidently, this particular feature, although important, is not essential
to the requisite family resemblance. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846–47
(2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2001).
267
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
268
Id. at 809.
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the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”269 “[T]hat the
officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the
traffic code . . . rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”270 The same would be true of an arrest actually
motivated by the desire to acquire a DNA profile. Probable cause to believe
that the individual committed a qualifying crime would render the arrest—
and the DNA collection—reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Whren doctrine of strictly objective cause is unnerving,
the King majority’s position that a magistrate’s review would serve no
purpose in confining police discretion as to DNA profiling is correct.
Certainly, a judge should—and must—verify the existence of probable
cause for an arrest to justify continued detention.271
But what
individualized determination could the magistrate make about DNA
profiling beyond the legislative classification that DNA from all people
arrested for qualifying offenses is worth acquiring and analyzing? Unlike
the commonsense, practical judgment of whether the available information
gives rise to probable cause to believe that a suspect committed a crime, the
magistrate would have to identify, within the sets of people arrested for
each qualifying offense, the ones who are sufficiently likely to have left
DNA at another crime scene. If the legislative classification is already
reasonable, and if everyone who is arrested must provide a sample, then the
magistrate has nothing left to decide.
Furthermore, police may not have much incentive to arrest simply as a
way to acquire a DNA sample. First, they would have to be confident that
they have probable cause for the arrest. If the arrest is deficient, the DNA
match that follows might have to be suppressed along with all derivative
evidence.272 Second, in most jurisdictions, police and prosecutors have
mechanisms to compel a suspect to submit to DNA testing on a lesser
showing than probable cause to believe that the DNA would link the
suspect to the crime being investigated. These include grand jury
subpoenas, nontestimonial court orders, and surreptitious DNA sampling.273
269

Id. at 813.
Id. at 819.
271
See County of Riverside v. McLaughin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (requiring a judicial
determination within forty-eight hours).
272
See David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines: Unrelated Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to
Early DNA Collection, 91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 9–10 (2012).
273
No court has treated collecting shed or inadvertently abandoned DNA as a search.
See Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated
Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445, 454 (2013). Police acting without a
warrant and without probable cause acquire DNA profiles from unsuspecting individuals by
inviting them to lunch, Ray Delgado, How Cop Got DNA to Nail Rapist: She Got Suspect to
Drink Soda, Then Snatched Straw, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 14, 2001, 4:00 AM),
270
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The additional ability to arrest someone when unrelated probable cause is
present might not produce a great uptick in warrantless DNA collection.274
In short, from both doctrinal and practical perspectives, the power that
Whren leaves with police to make pretextual arrests does not vitiate the
Court’s reliance on the absence of discretion in deciding to collect DNA
from an arrestee. Doctrinally, the Court always has upheld programs of
inventory searches that are justified by interests other than producing
evidence in criminal investigations as long as they are performed uniformly
rather than arbitrarily.275 DNA-BC, like any of these other programs, can
be abused, but the problem of pretextual arrests for DNA is not so much
more acute as to demand a different outcome.
D. NO BODILY INTRUSION

All the Justices seem to agree that the physical intrusion of buccal
swabbing is minor. Obviously, this fact is critical to the majority’s
balancing. But suppose that the dissent were correct in proposing that even
the most trivial physical intrusion justifiably triggers its categorical rule. A
state could collect DNA even less intrusively. At some point, would the
collection fall below the threshold of oppressiveness required for a “search”
to exist? For example, the government might only ask for a hand to be
placed on a sticky pad so that some cells would be deposited for analysis.
The dissent might respond that the “proud men who wrote the charter of our
liberties would [not] be so eager to [move their limbs] for royal
inspection,”276 but neither would those “proud men” be so eager to have
their pictures taken by a royal photographer, and photography itself does
http://goo.gl/PDNktY; intercepting their plates at a restaurant, Paresh Dave, Grim Sleeper:
Judge Allows DNA Evidence Gathered at Restaurant, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://goo.gl/mcgXUo; following them around in case they spit in a public place,
Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 430 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); having them sit in an
armchair while being questioned, Raynor v. State, 29 A.3d 617, 621 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2011); sending them forms to return in an envelope that they might lick, State v. Athan, 158
P.3d 27, 31–32 (Wash. 2007); keeping the mouthpiece from a breathalyzer into which they
were required to blow, People v. Thomas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 338, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011);
and so on, see Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight DNA Samples Gained on Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2008, at A1 (collecting instances of surreptitious DNA collection by police).
274
Cf. Murphy, supra note 66, at 173 (“As a routine matter, officers during ‘stop-andfrisks’ ask suspects to ‘voluntarily’ submit to swabbing. Those arrested for low-level
offenses are given the chance to ‘spit and acquit.’ Police during traffic stops lawfully
request swabs to verify identity. And of course any offender actually processed at the
precinct has a mug shot and DNA sample taken as a matter of course—if the law does not
explicitly allow genetic sampling, then police can simply swab the cuffs or cell.”).
275
See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (automobile); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (arrestee’s shoulder bag).
276
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not even rise to the level of a search that requires justification under the
Fourth Amendment.277
Once DNA sampling is divorced from any intrusion into the body, the
property invasion rule that has appealed to many of the Justices in the past
few terms to handle GPS surveillance278 and dog sniffs279 becomes useless.
One must either revert to the murky reasonable expectation of privacy
standard of Katz v. United States280 or adopt a broader, ordinary language
definition of a search followed by a balancing test.281 Inasmuch as Justice
Scalia’s opinion in King relies entirely on a physical invasion to trigger the
Fourth Amendment,282 it has nothing to say about the no-physical-intrusion
manner of gathering DNA data.283
E. OUTER-DIRECTED DATABASE TRAWLING (A.K.A. “FAMILIAL
SEARCHING”)

Maryland (and Washington, D.C.) explicitly prohibit trawling in a
database for the purpose of detecting very close relatives who might be the
source of the crime scene sample. The Court noted this part of Maryland’s
laws,284 but it did not consider whether this ban actually mattered in its
balancing.285
Although such “outer-directed” trawling has been criticized as a grave
invasion of the privacy of individuals whose DNA is in the database as well
277

See id. at 1986; cf. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (“The exterior of a
car . . . is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’”).
278
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
279
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
280
See Kaye, supra note 39, at 482 (arguing that the sensitivity of the information in the
full genome suffices to make physical DNA sampling a search under Katz).
281
See SLOBOGIN, supra note 134, at 210 (proposing a “proportionality principle” that
“allows courts to modulate the cause needed to carry out physical and transaction
surveillance depending on its intrusiveness”); see also Amar, supra note 45, at 769.
282
At oral argument, Justice Scalia appeared impatient with questions about a reasonable
expectation of privacy and told Mr. King’s counsel that “I wouldn’t have made the
concession that you’ve made, that this case is about reasonable expectation of privacy. . . .
[H]ere, there is a search. You have a physical intrusion. You—you pull a guy’s cheek apart
and stick a—a swab into his mouth. That’s a search, reasonable expectation of privacy or
not.” Transcript, supra note 28, at 34.
283
Of course, if the Court were to adopt the categorical exception for biometric data to
the per se rule and include DNA data within this exception, it would not be necessary to
resolve the question of what defines a search. DNA-BC would be constitutional even if it is
a search, just as it would be constitutional if it is not.
284
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013).
285
Some hasty commentary on the day of the opinion saw the opinion as throwing into
doubt the constitutionality of outer-directed database trawls. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill,
Supreme Court Thinks DNA Collection Is Awesome, Worth the Invasion of Arrestees’
Privacy, FORBES (June 3, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://goo.gl/Py3pra.
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as that of their relatives,286 the argument seems weak that the practice, if
implemented properly, is unconstitutional. But untangling and assessing
the argument requires careful attention to the impact of the practice on the
interests of both the individual whose profile is in the database and the
individual’s close relatives. This is not the place to undertake that task. 287
Even if using “familial searching” software and following up on any leads
to people outside the database were unconstitutional, that conclusion would
not prevent the state from collecting and using DNA profiles from arrestees
or convicted offenders with conventional software to generate normal hits
within the database.
F. PROFILING BEFORE CHARGING

The King decision is limited to a system that defers DNA analysis until
charges have been brought. On the one hand, the dissent complained that
this delay undercuts the majority’s claim that DNA-BC is for authenticating
the identity of the arrestee.288 On the other hand, the majority seemed
comforted by the existence of a judicial finding of probable cause to believe
that the arrestee is guilty of an offense. In particular, Justice Kennedy
wrote that “[o]nce an individual has been arrested on probable cause for a
dangerous offense that may require detention before trial, however, his or
her expectations of privacy and freedom from police scrutiny are
reduced.”289
Although initially appealing, it is hard to see why a line of
constitutional magnitude must be drawn at the point of a probable cause
determination. If what the Court meant by reduced “expectations of privacy
and freedom” is that the state may subject a prisoner to other humiliating
and privacy-reducing procedures, such as unannounced inspections of cells
and strip searches, then its observation begs the question.290 That a person
286
See Murphy, supra note 254, at 313–19; see also Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic
Evidence, supra note 215, at 36–38 (arguing that pursuing leads to relatives through
database trawls “may also harm, rather than help, innocent persons” and may reveal
“sensitive information”).
287
For one interest-based analysis, see Kaye, supra note 254, at 138–61.
288
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1983 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Maryland officials did not even
begin the process of testing King’s DNA that day [of the arrest]. Or, actually, the next day.
Or the day after that. And that was for a simple reason: Maryland law forbids them to do
so.”).
289
Id. at 1978 (majority opinion). In at least one earlier case, the Court spoke of an
arrest as reducing expectations of privacy. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10
(1977) (“Unlike searches of the person, searches of possessions within an arrestee’s
immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the
arrest.” (internal citation omitted)).
290
See supra text accompanying note 259.
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loses some—even a great deal of—privacy because he is in custody merely
(and obscurely) restates the conclusion that certain searches or seizures are
permissible. That conclusion does not automatically reduce the individual’s
interest in maintaining other aspects of privacy. Police may not rush out
and search an arrestee’s apartment without a warrant just because he has
numerically fewer “expectations of privacy and freedom” while in jail.
Nonetheless, a finding of probable cause to hold an individual for trial
does justify continued detention, and the state’s interests in detaining
arrestees and bringing them to trial adds to the justifications for pretrial
DNA testing. For example, the majority reasoned that an individual’s
commission of a crime—say, a brutal rape—unrelated to the arrest might
increase his flight risk if he realized that a conviction would require him to
provide a DNA sample under the state’s convicted offender DNA statute,
thereby putting him at risk of a DNA match to the rape.291 If the individual
is not charged after his arrest, however, this justification evaporates.
Furthermore, to the extent people who are validly charged are more likely
to have committed DNA-related crimes than are people who have been
arrested but not validly charged, the state has a greater interest in trawling
the crime scene profiles for possible matches.
Consequently, a prosecutor’s decision to bring some charges and a
judicial finding of probable cause are relevant. But are they decisive? A
prosecutor may choose not to pursue a case even when there is probable
cause, and a magistrate might mistakenly find that such cause is lacking
even when it is actually present. As a consequence, the state would lose the
opportunity to discover whether the arrestee is linked to other crimes.
Taking DNA and completing a database search immediately avoids this
negative impact on the government’s interests. As long as DNA sampling
is minimally intrusive and the privacy interests in the identification profiles
are weak, the net balance of state and individual interests does not seem to
change substantially if the DNA sampling and analysis occur at or close to
the initial booking,292 as it can with microfluidic technology.293

291

King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973.
Kaye, supra note 272, at 10–11.
293
See generally Catherine Rivet et al., Microfluidics for Medical Diagnostics and
Biosensors, 66 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING SCI. 1490 (2011) (explaining the technology). On
the application of the technology to forensic STR identification, see Andrew J. Hopwood et
al., Integrated Microfluidic System for Rapid Forensic DNA Analysis: Sample Collection to
DNA Profile, 82 ANAL. CHEM. 6991 (2010); Press Release, Bode Technology Offers First
Rapid DNA Service Delivering a DNA Profile from Evidentiary Samples in Under 90
Minutes (Aug. 27, 2012), http://goo.gl/PVrZwH; IntegenX Inc., RapidHIT System Approved
to Upload DNA Profiles to National Database, FORENSIC MAG. (Mar. 19, 2014, 3:43 PM),
http://goo.gl/ukhfJK.
292
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G. RETAINING WITHOUT CONVICTING

Finally, the King opinions do not address the reasonableness of
retaining samples or profiles when a conviction does not follow the arrest.
They did not have to, because Maryland law provides for the automatic
destruction of samples and records in that situation.294 But what about a
law that allows the state to retain the samples or profiles indefinitely, even
in the absence of a conviction or without regard to the desires of the
previously detained or convicted individual? The United Kingdom
followed this approach until the European Court of Human Rights ruled in
2008 that indefinite retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles and samples
violated the provision of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.”295 That court concluded that “the
permanent and indiscriminate retention of the fingerprint and DNA records
of . . . persons suspected but not convicted of offences . . . constitutes a
disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private
life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.”296 In
response to this rebuke, England now limits retention of fingerprints and
DNA profiles, in the absence of a conviction, to five years for certain major
offenses and to two years or less for minor ones; DNA samples are to be
destroyed within six months of being taken.297
As with profiling and trawling before charging in the United States,
however, continuing to trawl after charges are dropped or after a defendant
is acquitted violates almost no legitimate Fourth Amendment interests.298
When police show a mugshot of an arrested, but not convicted, defendant to
a victim of an assault, they do not engage in a new search or seizure. Nor,
for that matter, do they deprive the never-convicted arrestee of due process
294
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967. Some other jurisdictions place the burden of requesting
expungement on the individual. See generally Valerie Werse, Note, A “Lengthy, Uncertain,
and Expensive Process”: A Comparison of Types of Expungement from DNA Databases of
Arrestees, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 282 (2013). Although this difference could
have important practical consequences, it seems too slight to tip the scales against
constitutionality. Cf. Murphy, supra note 66, at 172 (“[I]n some respects the expungement
debate seems absurdly academic.”).
295
Regina (S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [2004] UKHL 39, rev’d sub
nom., S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 169 (citing European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.).
296
S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 117 & 125.
297
See Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: How DNA and Fingerprint Evidence Is
Protected in Law (Apr. 4, 2013), http://goo.gl/cBEPRN.
298
For efforts to canvass the relevant interests, see Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory,
supra note 123, at 1135–38; Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a Search,
supra note 192, at 46–49.
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of law simply because he is presumed innocent until found guilty beyond
any reasonable doubt at trial.299 Nor, if the photo spread is not unfairly
suggestive, do they violate due process, even though there is a risk of
misidentification300—usually a much greater one than occurs with a DNA
profile.301 Retaining and using the bare profile, then, seems permissible.
However, it is more debatable whether retaining the physical samples
creates an unreasonable risk of a harm that comes under the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. On the one hand, the state’s arguments for
indefinite sample retention are far from compelling.302 On the other hand, it
is not likely that police will look through the full genome for the kind of
299
See David H. Kaye, Associational Privacy, the Presumption of Innocence, and
“Corruption of Blood” as Constitutional Metaphors in the Debate on “Familial Searching,”
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. BLOG: MENS REA (Nov. 26, 2012, 10:06 AM), available at
http://goo.gl/80BzrO.
300
See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
301
See United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (“[N]o other investigative tool that we currently use, whether it be voice
identification, fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, or any other scientific or semi-scientific
method, . . . has nearly as good a record as CODIS.”). Opponents of DNA-BC portray
association-identification via DNA databases as error-prone or at least not error-free. See,
e.g., Murphy, supra note 66, at 192 (referring to “DNA typing’s own significant history of
error—including mixed samples, incompetent analysts, unexpected transfer, and the like—
that has led to false accusations and even convictions”); Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic
Evidence, supra note 215, at 25–36. It is possible that a large number of innocent suspects
have been put on trial and then convicted—and that these mistakes will never see the light of
day. See William C. Thompson, The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC EXPLANATIONS: SENSE
AND NONSENSE 227, 229 (Sheldon Krimsky & Jeremy Gruber eds., 2013) (stating that “the
errors we know about may be the tip of an iceberg of undetected or unreported errors”);
William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the ‘Gold Standard:’ Understanding Recent Problems in
Forensic DNA Testing, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 10–11 (repeating “the tip of an
ominous iceberg” to describe what we know now). One can write scenarios about crime
scenes that have been contaminated by planted or inadvertently transferred DNA from
innocent individuals who are nonetheless plausible suspects. See, e.g., Henry K. Lee, How
Innocent Man’s DNA Was Found at Killing Scene, S.F. CHRON. (June 26, 2013, 11:07 PM),
http://goo.gl/5qEGlE (explaining that paramedics who had been called to a murder scene
may have transferred DNA from a murder victim to another man they treated for intoxication
hours before). Moreover, identical twins or partly matching individuals could be implicated
as a result of a poor crime scene sample that yields a very incomplete profile. Nevertheless,
although “a number of false cold hits” have been reported, Thompson, The Myth of
Infallibility, supra, at 230, well-documented examples of false convictions from DNA
database trawls are few and far between. Cf. DNA Blunder: Man Accused of Rape After
Human Error, BBC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012, 8:40 PM), http://goo.gl/cw2bvz (detailing a case
in which rape charges were dismissed following a false match caused by improper re-use of
a plastic tray for robotic DNA extraction; subsequent investigation of 26,000 samples
extracted with the robotic system revealed “no other cases of contamination”).
302
See Kaye, supra note 221, at 298–99; David H. Kaye, Ninth Circuit Upholds
Indefinite Retention of DNA Samples: But Why Retain Them?, FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS &
LAW (Aug. 19, 2013), http://goo.gl/TbT4t7.

2014]

WHY SO CONTRIVED?

593

information that health insurers might want to know or that they will release
database samples to insurers or employers. The King majority basically
reasoned that statutory protections create a presumption that sensitive
data—beyond the individual’s apparent link to a crime—will not be
disclosed.303 This presumption of regularity suggests that continued
retention is permissible.
Nonetheless, under the majority’s direct
reasonableness standard, it also can be argued that the state has less reason
to trawl crime scene databases for matches to people who never have been
convicted of the offenses that result in their inclusion in offender or arrestee
databases and who no longer are subject to pretrial detention or supervision.
When one balances two sets of lightweight interests, the outcome will be
close—but of no great moment.
CONCLUSION
Maryland v. King perpetuates doctrinal confusion over the necessary
conditions for program-specific balancing. The Court did not consider
crafting a new exception for biometric data to the per se rule of
unconstitutionality for warrantless searches. Likewise, it apparently did not
consider limiting the few cases that speak of a “primary purpose”
requirement as a barrier to a richer, multiple-needs basis for balancing.
Instead, it sought an opinion that would effect the least apparent change to
the existing categorical exceptions to the need for a warrant and probable
cause—by working outside that framework. As a result, even though the
Justices understood that DNA may solve unrelated cases, the majority
strained to justify collecting DNA on grounds specific to pretrial detention.
The Justices amassed as many pretrial state interests as they could find—
other than the most important one of prosecuting arrestees for other, and
possibly more serious, crimes than those for which they were arrested.
This strategy enabled the dissent to chastise the Court for a contrived
defense of Maryland’s law. But if the majority opinion was factitious, the
dissenting opinion was superficial, substituting Fourth Amendment
formalism for an assessment of the individual interests at stake. The
dissent’s theory of what the Amendment requires does not fit all the case
law and should not prevent a state from adopting a bona fide multimodal
system of biometrics—including DNA along with physical features—for
identity authentication and subsequent criminal intelligence gathering made
possible by modern databases.
The King Court’s painfully constricted inquiry into direct
reasonableness may have been adequate to resolve the case before it, but it
leaves unresolved significant questions about the constitutional limits of
303

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013).
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DNA databases. These questions would be more credibly handled by
incorporating the criminal-intelligence benefits of DNA databases into the
balancing test. This balancing could occur either in the Court’s exceptions
for special needs when programs do more than seek evidence about crimes
or, better still, in the course of framing a categorical exception to the per se
unreasonable rule for all biometric identifiers that are minimally invasive to
Fourth Amendment interests and that substantially further the full range of
state interests in collecting and using information on the distinguishing
features of individuals. Determining whether DNA identification systems
fall into this categorical exception depends primarily on the safeguards that
would curtail disclosure of data other than biological identity. With
sufficient safeguards, states and the federal government should be able to
resolve, according to their legislative visions of public policy, the questions
of which offenses should be used for DNA collection and how long samples
and profiles should be retained.
The categorical exception also would permit governments to step away
from contact with police as the cornerstone of inclusion. As a matter of
fairness and utility, what justifies “singling out still innocent defendants for
DNA testing and sparing the rest of us”?304 No one forfeits a right to keep
one’s DNA to oneself—not even by reason of a criminal conviction.305
Rather, the state can override an offender’s claim of a right not to release
DNA because the governmental interests in detecting and deterring crime
make the use of an offender’s DNA reasonable when it is useful or used
strictly for authentication- and association-identification. With innocent
arrestees, however, the public gain is less, and the line between the arrested
person and the rest of the innocent population is drawn in the faint ink of
probable cause.306
Although a population-wide DNA database is not on the political
horizon (and may never be), the vision of universality should play a role,
even in today’s arrest-based DNA-BC systems. King confirms that states
have the constitutional power to take DNA upon or shortly after arrest, not
only for authentication-identification but also for association-identification.
In developing systems of DNA-BC, “[l]egislators and database

304

Lempert, supra note 256.
Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1133.
306
Furthermore, “the police do not arrest innocent people at random. Minorities appear
particularly vulnerable. . . . [B]lacks who have not committed the crime leading to their
arrest are at greater risk than similarly innocent whites of being linked to another crime
through DNA profiling.” Lempert, supra note 256. “Still the cure should be to arrest more
white criminals and not to let other[s] who have committed crimes go free. Moreover, since
much crime is intraracial those saved from future rapes or killings will often have the same
heritage as those captured.” Id.
305
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administrators should do unto others as they would to themselves. They
should not adopt or operate any DNA identification system unless they
would be willing to include their own DNA in the system.”307
This precept, applied with an appreciation of the nature of the actual
threats to privacy, should advance law enforcement interests while still
respecting valid privacy concerns. Fingerprints, photographs, and DNA
profiles each sometimes can be used to determine where someone was at
some point in the past, and all these biometric traits possess some inherited
features.308 Libertarians may instinctively resent and oppose the desire of
governments to amass all the information they can, and policymakers of all
persuasions should worry about the emergence of new surveillance and
information systems. But singly or in combination, the three biometrics are
not the equivalent of Bentham’s panopticon—a building in which the
locations and movements of everyone and everything are instantly and
always visible—or of Orwell’s 1984—a world with two-way telescreens
and hidden microphones in every home. In using biometrics for some
forms of “identification,” as defined in King, DNA (and other databases) of
appropriate scope, cost, and efficacy can contribute to efforts to enforce
criminal law without trampling legitimate interests in personal privacy.
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Kaye, supra note 48, at 48.
See Brief of Genetics, supra note 211, at 36; Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory,
supra note 123, at 1135–36, 1141, 1152–53.
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